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L Introduction
In 1967, a consortium of foreign companies (wholly owned subsidiaries
of Texaco and Gulf Oil, both now part of Chevron Corporation), struck oil
in the Amazon Rainforest in Ecuador. The discovery was heralded as the
salvation of Ecuador's economy, the product that would pull the nation out
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who came together in the wake of the dismissal of the class action lawsuit, Aguinda v. Texaco,
Inc., to take legal action to remedy injuries caused by ChevronTexaco's operations in the
Amazon Rainforest in Ecuador. In addition to the sources cited infra, this symposium article
draws on the author's observations during regular visits since 1989 to oil field facilities and
affected communities; participation in local, national, and international fora; interviews and
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and recent academic research, first published in Judith Kimerling, Indigenous Peoples and the
Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, andAguinda v. Texaco, 38
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 413 (2006).
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of chronic poverty and "underdevelopment" at last. At the time, the national
economy was centered on the production and export of bananas.1
Exports of Amazon crude began in 1972, after Texaco, the operator of the
consortium, completed construction ofa 313-mile pipeline to transport crude
oil out of the remote Amazon region, across the Andes Mountains to the
Pacific coast. The "first barrel" was paraded through the streets of the
capital, Quito, like a hero. In some neighborhoods, people could greet it
with cups to get drops of crude to commemorate the occasion. After the
parade, the oil drum was placed on an alter-like structure at the Eloy Alfaro
Military Academy.2
The reality of oil development, however, turned out to be far more
complex than its triumphalist launch. For indigenous Amazonian peoples,
the arrival of Texaco's work crews meant destruction rather than progress.
Their homelands were invaded by outsiders with unrelenting technological,
military and economic power. The first ones came from the sky; over time,
they dramatically transformed natural and social environments. Their
worlds changed forever, Amazonian peoples have borne the costs of oil
development without sharing in its benefits or participating in a meaningful
way in political and environmental decisions that affect them.
In 1993, a class action lawsuit was filed against Texaco in federal court
in New York on behalf of indigenous and settler residents of Ecuador's oil
fields who have been harmed by pollution from the company's operations.
In 2002, the case, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., was dismissed on the ground of
forum non conveniens, in favor of litigation in Ecuador. The court denied
the plaintiffs a day in court in Texaco's homeland, ruling that the lawsuit
belongs in Ecuador because it has "everything to do with Ecuador and
nothing to do with the United States."3 The dismissal was conditioned on
Texaco's agreement to submit to jurisdiction of Ecuador's courts and was
affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.4
This article begins with a brief review of events leading to the lawsuit,
followed by a discussion of the decision to dismiss. The review - which
includes an analysis of petroleum policy, Amazon policy, and environmental
protection policy in Ecuador, in Part II, and a description of the operations
1. The other principal exports were cocoa and coffee. JOHN D. MARTZ, POLIcs AND
PETROLEUM IN ECUADOR 122, 157 (1978).
2. Interview with Mariana Acosta, Executive Director, Foundation Images for a New
World, in Quito, Ecuador (Mar. 3, 1994).
3. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
4. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 2002).
446 [Vol. 31
No. 2] TRANSNATIONAL OPERATIONS, BI-NATIONAL INJUSTICE 447
and affected peoples, in Part III - calls into question the court's finding that
the case has "nothing to do with the United States." Part IV discusses the
lawsuit and further concludes that the decision to dismiss Aguinda was
colored by a series of detailed, but questionable, factual assumptions relating
to control of the operations and the history of litigation in Ecuador's courts.
Parts V and VI examine legal and political developments in the wake of the
dismissal, including the emergence of an unprecedented community-based
alliance (Makarik Nihua) among a significant sector of indigenous members
of the putative Aguinda class - Kichwa and Huaorani in the Napo and
Cononaco river basins - who came together to speak for themselves and to
defend and vindicate their claims. Part VII concludes with some general
observations and recommendations.
I. Background: Governments and Policy in Ecuador
Texaco's discovery of commercially valuable oil sparked an oil rush, and
petroleum quickly came to dominate Ecuador's economy. Initially, the
boom stimulated nationalist sentiments in petroleum policymakers. The
government claimed state ownership of oil reserves, created a state oil
company (Corporaci6n Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, CEPE, now
Petroecuador), acquired ownership interests in the consortium that
developed the fields, raised taxes, and demanded investments in
infrastructure.
Before long, however, international economic realities asserted
themselves and government officials learned that they had less power than
was commonly believed. Texaco and other transnational companies
launched a counteroffensive to increase profitability and fend off the specter
of nationalization. As the operator of Ecuador's commercial fields,
Texaco's strategy of halting selected field activities and its public relations
campaign were particularly effective in putting pressure on the government.
Traditionalist domestic elites also favored the interests of foreign oil
companies.5
Although relations between Ecuador and Texaco and other oil companies
have not been static, at the core of those relationships lies an enduring
political reality. Since the oil boom began, successive governments have
linked national development plans and economic policy almost exclusively
with petroleum policy, and the health of the industry has become a central
concern for the State. Domestically, the industry dominates the economy.
5. MARTZ, supra note 1, at 131-32, 144-54, 395.
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But in the international arena, Ecuador is a relatively small producer. As a
result, it is vulnerable to international pressures, including demands of
foreign companies. Oil development has accentuated Ecuador's dependence
on foreign export markets and foreign investment, technology, and expertise.
At the same time, because oil is a nonrenewable resource, levels of
production and revenues cannot be sustained without ongoing operations to
find and develop new reserves, activities that are capital intensive and
technology driven. Thus, when confronted with the realities of oil politics,
governments in Ecuador have vacillated over the extent to which petroleum
policy should be nationalistic or accommodate the interests of foreign
companies. Alarm over forecasts of the depletion of productive reserves has
become a recurring theme in petroleum politics, along with the twin policy
goals of expanded reserves and renewed exploration to locate new reserves,
and the corollary need to reform laws and policies to make the nation more
attractive to foreign investors.6
The initial bonanza and easy money from Texaco's early finds were
relatively short lived, and just five years after production began, in 1977, "a
flood of foreign borrowing" by the government was needed to sustain
economic growth.7 Ecuador has been able to secure very large loans for its
size because of its oil reserves and has accumulated a staggering foreign
debt. Currently, payments on the debt account for more than 40% of the
national budget. At the same time, the benefits of oil development have not
been well distributed and the percentage of Ecuadorians living in poverty
remains stubbornly high.'
6. For a fuller discussion, see Judith Kimerling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier
in Amazonia: The Case ofEcuador, Chevron Texaco, andAguindav. Texaco, 38 N.Y.U.J. INT'L
L. & POL. 413 (2006) [hereinafter Kimerling, Oil Frontier in Amazonia]; MARTZ, supra note
1.
7. MARTZ, supra note 1, at 207-08.
8. Government figures reported in the press in 1995 put the poverty level at 67% of the
population, up from 47% in 1975. En el Ecuador el 67% es Pobre [In Ecuador, 67% Are
Poor], EL COMERCIO, Mar. 7, 1995, at C3 (on file with author). A recent World Bank analysis
of development trends over two decades found that both poverty and the gap between the rich
and poor have increased. See WORLD BANK, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION TO THE ExECuTIvE DIRECTORS ON A COUNTRY
ASSISTANCE STRATEGY FORTHE REPUBLIC OFECUADOR (2003) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, 2003
REPORT]. Income inequality is among the highest in the world. Id. 9. In 2001, the richest
fifth of the population received 64% of the national income while the poorest fifth received only
1.7%. Id. 11. The figures reported in 1996 were 53% and 5%, respectively. WORLD BANK,
SOCIAL INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT 1996, at 101 (1996). Real economic growth per capita
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When the oil rush began, Ecuadorian institutions had very little presence
or influence in the Amazon region. The discovery of black gold made the
conquest of Amazonia a national imperative. It also provided infrastructure
to penetrate remote, previously inaccessible areas, and monies to support the
military and bureaucracy. Ecuador launched a policy of national integration
to incorporate the Amazon into the national economy and assimilate its
native peoples into the dominant national culture. Successive governments
have viewed the Amazon as a frontier to be conquered, a source of wealth
for the State, and an escape valve for land distribution pressures in the
highland and coastal regions.
Government policies in the 1970s and 1980s aggressively promoted
internal colonization of the Amazon. The government promised land titles
and credit to settlers (colonists) who migrated to the region, cleared the rain
forest, and planted crops or pasture, even though most soils are not well
suited to livestock or mono-crop production. Government officials pledged
to "civilize" indigenous Amazonian peoples.
Most indigenous people, however, did not want to be "civilized" by
outsiders. To them, "civilization" and assimilation meant rejecting their
beliefs and traditions and entering the lowest social and economic levels of
Ecuadorian society. It meant new diseases that shamans and rainforest
plants could not cure, the erosion of food security and self-reliance in
meeting basic needs, and encroachments on the exercise of their rights to
culture and self-determination. The loss of ancestral lands threatened their
very survival. From the perspective of native peoples, the government's
national integration policy meant national expansion and ethnocide.9
It was not until 1990 that Ecuador formally recognized indigenous land
rights and began systematically granting land titles to indigenous groups.
By that time, oil development and internal colonization had displaced native
peoples from many areas, significantly reducing their traditional territories.
Nonetheless, the change in policy was a major victory for indigenous
peoples. It followed years of struggle by indigenous organizations and was
was negative (-0.6%) in 1980-89 and zero in 1990-1999. WORLD BANK, 2003 REPORT, supra,
11.
9. For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling, Oil Frontier in Amazonia, supra note 6;
NORMAN E. WHITEN, JR., INT'L WORK GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, ECUADORIAN
ETHNOCIDE AND INDIGENOUS ETENOGENESIS: AMAZONIAN RESURGENCE AMIDST ANDEAN
COLONIALISM (1976). On a visit to the Amazon in 1972, President General Rodriguez Lara
rebuffed an appeal for formal recognition of indigenous peoples in the government's new
development policies. "There is no more Indian problem," he proclaimed. "We all become
white when we accept the goals of the national culture." Id. at 12.
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evidently also influenced by emerging international support for the
collective rights of indigenous peoples.
In 1998, Ecuador formally recognized the multi-cultural nature of the
country and some collective rights of indigenous peoples when it ratified
International Labor Organization Convention 16910 and included indigenous
rights that echo provisions in the international agreement in a new
constitution." The State continues to claim ownership of oil and other
subsurface minerals in indigenous lands, however, and implementation of
indigenous rights in the oil patch has lagged. 2
In the environmental arena, Ecuador's Law of Hydrocarbons 3 has
included boilerplate environmental directives since at least 1971. Early
provisions required oil field operators to "adopt necessary measures to
protect the flora, fauna and other natural resources" and to prevent
contamination of water, air, and soil. 4 Similarly, Texaco's production
10. International Labour Organisation [ILO], Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous
& Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382.
11. See ECUADOR CONST. OF 1998, arts. 83-85. Expanded environmental rights were also
included in the new constitution, including provisions that echo rights and duties in
international instruments to promote sustainable development. See id. arts. 86-91; see also id
art. 23(6); U.N. Conference on the Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 13-14,
1992, Rio Declaration on Environment andDevelopment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/Rev. 1 (June
14, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874.
12. For example, in a study of standards and practices for environmental protection and
community relations in the area leased to Occidental Petroleum, the author found that- despite
both the legal reforms and public pledges by the company to voluntarily raise standards and
respect its indigenous neighbors - efforts by indigenous Kichwa to participate in
environmental and development decision-making and monitoring had been rebuffed, and
community lands solicited by Occidental for use for production facilities had been expropriated
by the state without the knowledge or consent of affected communities. See generally Judith
Kimerling, Rio + 10: Indigenous Peoples, Transnational Corporations and Sustainable
Development in Amazonia, 27 COLuM. J. ENvTL. L. 523 (2002) [hereinafter Kimerling, Rio +
10]; Judith Kimerling, Uncommon Ground: Occidental's Land Access and Community
Relations Standards and Practices in Quichua Communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon, 11
LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY 179 (200 1) [hereinafter Kimerling, Uncommon Ground].
13. Ley de Hidrocarburos [Law of Hydrocarbons], Decreto Supremo No. 2967 [Supreme
Decree No. 2967], R.O. No. 711 (Nov. 15, 1978), amended by DL 101, R.O. No. 306 (Aug. 13,
1982) (Ecuador) (on file with author).
14. Id. art. 31 (s)-(t). In 1982, the provisions were amended to require companies to submit,
for approval by Ecuador's Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM), "plans, programs and
projects" to protect natural resources and prevent adverse social and economic impacts on local
communities; and to require operators to conduct operations in accordance with Ecuador's
environmental laws, regulations, and international practice "in matters of preservation of the
rich fisheries and farming industry." R.O. No. 306 (Aug. 13, 1982) (Ecuador).
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contract with Ecuador, negotiated after the discovery of commercially
valuable reserves and signed in 1973, required Texaco "to adopt suitable
measures to protect flora, fauna, and other natural resources and to prevent
contamination of water, air and soil under the control of pertinent organs of
the state."' 5  In theory, those and other, comparable requirements in
generally applicable laws 6 offer mechanisms for regulation of significant
sources of oil field pollution. In practice, however, Texaco and other oil
companies have ignored the laws, and successive governments have failed
to implement and enforce them. 7
When Texaco began its operations, there was little public awareness or
political interest in environmental issues. In addition, environmental
protection in the oil patch depends on the use of technology, and Ecuador
relied on Texaco, as the operator of the fields, to transfer petroleum
technology and train national technicians. Ecuadorian officials saw Texaco
as a prestigious international company with vast experience in the oil patch
and access to "world class" technology and capital. They relied on Texaco
to design, procure, construct, and operate the infrastructure that turned
Ecuador into an oil exporter. In its new production agreement, Texaco's
wholly owned subsidiary, Texaco Petroleum Company (TexPet), agreed to
use "modern and efficient" equipment; 8 maintain the equipment and
15. Decreto Supremo No. 925 [Supreme Decree No. 925], cl. 46.1 (Aug. 16, 1973)
(Ecuador) [hereinafter 1973 Production Contract] (on file with author).
16. See, e.g., Ley de Aguas [Law of Waters], art. 22, Supreme Decree No. 369, R.O. No.
69 (May 30, 1972) (Ecuador); President of the Republic, Reglamento General para la
Aplicaci6n de la Ley de Aguas [General Regulation for the Application of the Law of Waters],
art. 89, R.O. No. 233 (Jan. 26, 1973) (Ecuador); Ley de Pesca y Desarrollo Pesquero [Law of
Fishing and Fishing Development], arts. 15, 47, 80, 92, R.O. No. 497 (Feb. 19, 1974)
(Ecuador), renumbered in R.O. No. 252 (Aug. 19, 1985); Ley para la Prevenci6n y Control de
Contaminaci6n Ambiental [Law for the Prevention and Control of Environmental
Contamination], R.O. No. 204 (June 5, 1989) (Ecuador); Ministerio de Salud Pfiblica [Ministry
of Public Health], Reglamento para la Prevenci6n y Control de la Contaminaci6n en lo Relativo
al Recurso Agua [Regulations for the Prevention and Control of Environmental Contamination
Related to Water Resources], R.O. No. 204 (June 5, 1989) (Ecuador).
17. In practice, government intervention in the hydrocarbon sector is dominated by MEM
and Petroecuador. See Judith Kimerling, Rights, Responsibilities, andRealities: Environmental
Protection Law in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields, 2 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 293, 334 (1995)
[hereinafter Kimerling, Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities]. Environmental units were not
created in those entities until 1984 and 1990, respectively. Id. at 339. Irrespective of
government regulation, Texaco had a duty of care under Ecuador's Civil Code. Id. at 323, 351-
58.
18. 1973 Production Contract, supra note 15, cl. 40.1.
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facilities in good working order;' 9 train Ecuadorian students;2 ° and turn over
the field operations and equipment to Petroecuador "in good condition"
when the contract ended in 1992.21
In the environmental law vacuum, Texaco set its own environmental
standards and policed itself. As Petroecuador's "professor," Texaco also set
standards for that company's operations. Texaco's standards and practices,
however, did not include environmental protection or monitoring. The
company did not instruct its Ecuadorian personnel about environmental
matters, and oil field workers who were trained by Texaco were so unaware
of the hazards of crude oil during the 1970s and 1980s that they applied it
to their heads to prevent balding. They sat in the sun or covered their hair
with plastic caps overnight. To remove the crude, they washed their hair
with diesel. Similarly, many workers took jars of crude to parents suffering
from arthritis. 22 The rumors attributing medicinal qualities to Amazon crude
are not entirely surprising, considering its status as the harbinger of a great
future for the nation and Texaco's neglect of environmental and human
health concerns.
Thus, Ecuador's petroleum policy in the 1970s and 1980s revolved
around economic and national development issues and did not include a
serious environmental component. The evidence in the historical record,
however, does not suggest that environmental neglect was a conscious and
informed policy choice by Ecuador at that time. Unlike Texaco, which had,
or should have had, knowledge about both the hazards of oil field pollution
19. Id. cl. 40.2.
20. Id. cl. 38.1.
21. Id. cl. 51; see also id. cl. 18.2(a)-(b). On June 6, 1974, two years after commercial
production began, Petroecuador (then CEPE) acquired a 12.5% participating interest in the
Texaco-Gulf consortium from Texaco and a 12.5% interest from Gulf, giving it a 25% share of
stock in the consortium. Republic of Ecuador, Ministry of Energy and Mines, Contrato para la
Ejecuci6n de Trabajos de Reparaci6n Medioambiental y Liberaci6n de Obligactiones,
Responsabilidades y Demandas [Contract for Implementation of Environmental Remedial Work
and Release from Obligations, Liability and Claims] at 2 (May 4, 1995). Under pressure, Gulf
sold its remaining interests to Petroecuador in 1977 and left the country. With 62.5% of the
stock, Petroecuador became the majority shareholder in the new consortium; Texaco retained
ownership of 37.5% of the stock and continued to be the operator of the consortium's assets.
MARTZ, supra note 1, at 111, 168, 186; see also Answer to the Complaint filed by Maria
Aguinda Salazar v. ChevronTexaco Corp., Part II.A. 1.18, Superior Court of Nueva Loja
(Ecuador) (Oct. 21, 2003), available at http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/docs/2003oct21
_dismiss.pdf.
22. Interview with Margarita Ydpez, former social worker for Texaco Petroleum
(1973-1989), in Quito, Ecuador (Mar. 3, 1994).
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and the technology that could be used to reduce it, such as reinjecting rather
than discharging oil field brine (a high-volume waste, also known as"produced water"), the Ecuadorians were inexperienced and apparently
unaware of the environmental tradeoffs in the oil patch. In the triumphalist
welcome to Texaco's discovery of commercially valuable oil and the
struggle over whether petroleum policy should accommodate foreign
companies or be nationalistic, environmental protection was eclipsed
altogether.
Indeed, when environmental officials in Ecuador's Ministry of Energy
and Mines (MEM) were confronted in 1990 with a study (subsequently
published as Amazon Crude) by an environmental lawyer from the United
States (the author) that documented shocking pollution and other impacts
from operations by Texaco and other companies, the officials professed
ignorance. Texaco was their "professor," they explained; the company
taught them how to produce oil but did not teach them environmental
protection.23
That basic view - that public officials did not realize that industry
operations were taking a serious toll on the environment until international
environmentalists put a spotlight on the region - has been echoed by
others.24 For example, according to General Rene Vargas Pazzos, who was
a key policymaker in the military government that ruled Ecuador when the
oil rush began, government officials did not question Texaco about
23. JUDITH KIMERLING, AMAZON CRUDE ix, xxvi (1991) [hereinafter KIMERLING, AMAZON
CRUDE]. The author's study was the first to document widespread pollution and other
environmental and social impacts from oil development in tropical forests. It was based on
extensive field work undertaken in 1989-90, in collaboration with the indigenous organizations,
FCUNAE (Federation of Comunas Union of Natives of the Ecuadorian Amazon) and
CONFENIAE (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon), and other
research. The disclosures first appeared in a draft report in 1989. Subsequently, the author
expanded the report; in 1991, it was published with color photographs as Amazon Crude by
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), a prestigious U.S. nongovernmental organization
(NGO). A Spanish-language adaptation was published with FCUNAE by Abya Yala
Publications. JUDITH KIMERLING, CRUDO AMAzONICO (1993).
24. Prior to Amazon Crude, even prominent rainforest literature mistakenly reported that
oil development did not directly harm the environment, reflecting, among other factors, the
focus by environmental advocates on deforestation. See, e.g., Stephen Mills, Ecuadorians Join
Over Forest Oil, BBC WILDLIFE, Mar. 1990, at 187, 187 (reporting that a team from the World
Conservation Union (IUCN) gave oil development in Ecuador "a clean bill of health" due to the
relatively small areas affected by deforestation); ADRIAN FORSYTH & KEN MIYATA, TROPICAL
NATURE 209 (1984); JAMES D. NATIONS, TROPICAL RAINFORESTS: ENDANGERED ENVIRONMENT
108-11 (1988).
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
environmental practices because they did not question Texaco's technical
expertise or know that the operations could damage the environment:
We thought oil would generate a lot of money and that
development would benefit the country, but we did not have
technical know-how, and no one told us that oil was bad [for the
environment].... We were fooled by Texaco. We were betrayed.
We trusted the company .... Texaco was responsible for all of
the operations .... We were not experts .... The [MEM]
Hydrocarbons Directorate approved the work, but the technology
came from Texaco. It is like contracting a doctor. You go in and
can see that the room is fine. But with the operation, it is beyond
your control and know-how. We accepted [Texaco's technical
decisions] with good faith....
We were happy about the petroleum. We said, "Do it and tell
us what it will cost.". . . But we did not know about
environmental issues. . . . We thought Texaco used the best
methods.... Texaco was the operator. We did not interfere in
technical decisions because that was Texaco's responsibility.
That is what we paid them for. . . . We controlled only the
production rates, the payment of taxes [and things like that] ... 25
According to Vargas, all of the work plans and technical specifications
for the operations were elaborated and approved by Texaco in the United
States and sent to Quito from the company's Latin America/West Africa
Division, based in Coral Gables, Florida.26 According to Margarita Yepez,
who worked for Texaco Petroleum from 1973-1989 and was based in Quito,
the operations were closely supervised from the Coral Gables office: every
department head in Quito had a direct telephone line to a supervisor in Coral
Gables; important contracts for field operations were approved and signed
in the United States; expenditures were closely supervised from the United
25. Interview with General Rend Vargas Pazzos (Ret.), former General Manager of
Petroecuador, 1973-1975, and former Minister of Natural Resources (now MEM), 1976-1977,
in Quito, Ecuador (July 4, 2001).
26. Id.; see also Unswom Declaration by Manuel E. Navarro V. Subject to Punishment for
Perjury in Brief Amicus Curiae for the Federation of Comunas Union of Natives of the
Ecuadorian Amazon (FCUNAE) and Affiliated Communities and of the Indigenous
Organization of the Cofin Nation of Ecuador (OINCE) and Affiliated Communities, Aguinda
v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, Exhibit 3, 2-5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Brief
Amicus Curiae of FCUNAE & OINCE].
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States; and the Quito office had a full-time employee to microfilm all reports
and other written materials to send to Coral Gables in a daily mail pouch."
Texaco's international prestige and its day-to-day control as the operator
of field operations gave the company enormous power in the oil patch -
power that was compounded by systemic deficiencies in the rule of law and
governance in Ecuador. Texaco's power and the culture of impunity in the
oil fields - the belief that companies can do whatever they want and suffer
no adverse consequences as long as they get the oil - is illustrated in a
remark by an Ecuadorian worker in 1993, the year after Texaco's production
contract expired. The man worked for a subcontractor, driving a truck that
dumped untreated oil on roads for dust control and maintenance purposes.
When asked (by the author) what he thought about the practice and whether
he had any concerns for his health or the environment, he replied: "Three
years ago, I went to a training course.., and a gringo from Texaco told us
that oil nourishes the brain and retards aging. He said that in the United
States they do this on all of the roads, and people there are very intelligent."
When asked if he believed what the trainer from Texaco had said, he
answered: "It doesn't matter what I think; here, Texaco, and now
Petroecuador, manda, gives the orders. Everyone works for them."2
In the wake of Amazon Crude, environmental protection has become an
important policy issue in Ecuador. Since the early 1990s, both government
officials and oil companies must at least appear to be "green." It remains to
be seen, however, whether those changes in consciousness and discourse
will lead to environmentally significant changes in the field. To date, the
record is not encouraging, despite both public pledges by a growing number
of companies to voluntarily raise environmental standards and a clear trend
on paper toward increasingly detailed, albeit incomplete, environmental
legal rights and requirements, including constitutional recognition since
1984 of the right of individuals to live in an environment "free from
contamination" and expanded constitutional group environmental rights
since 1998.29 As in other areas of the law, the failure of the state to
implement meaningful environmental protection law reflects the enormous
gap between legal ideals and social and political realities.3 °
27. Unsworn Declaration by Bertha Margarita Ydpez Silva Subject to Punishment for
Perjury, in Brief Amicus Curiae of FCUNAE & OINCE, supra note 26, Exhibit 2, 2-5.
28. The exchange took place in the field on Sept. 26, 1993.
29. For the current provision, see ECUADOR CONST. OF 1998, art. 23(6). For the earlier
provision, see ECUADOR CONST. OF 1979, art. 19(2) (provision adopted in 1984).
30. In form, Ecuador is a constitutional democracy. In practice, democratic institutions are
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fragile and unstable, and the legitimacy of the political system is minimal. Public confidence
in political elites and institutions, including the courts and bureaucracy, is low, and political
parties and public officials are widely considered to be among the most corrupt in Latin
America. See, e.g., Kimerling, Rights, Responsibilities, and Realities, supra note 17, at 310-03.
Governments change with considerable frequency, and even when regimes stay in power,
turnover at the highest levels is not uncommon. For example, between 1830, when Ecuador
became a republic, and 1895, twenty-one individuals andjuntas occupied Ecuador's presidency
for a total of thirty-four times; only six completed their constitutional term of office. DAVID
CORKILL & DAVID CuBrT, ECUADOR: FRAGILE DEMOCRACY 10 (1988). Between 1925 and
1947, twenty-three heads of state were catapulted in and out of office. During 1948-1960, three
successive elected administrations completed their term of office, but this apparent stabilization
of democracy was followed by more volatility. At the time of Texaco's oil strike (1967),
Ecuador was governed by an interim president. In 1968, a popularly elected president took
office. After two years, he suspended the constitution and assumed dictatorial powers, but in
1972 he was removed by the military, amidst a wave of popular protest. MARTZ, supra note 1,
at 5-6. In 1979, the military ceded power to a constitutional civilian government. Id. at 247.
The new president, Jaime Roldos Aguilera was killed in a suspicious plane crash two years into
his term. Id. at 249-57, 303. The next three elected presidents each completed their
constitutional term of office; however, since President Sixto Durdn Ballen left office in 1996,
no elected president has completed his term of office, and eight different individuals have
occupied the presidency. For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling, Oil Frontier in Amazonia,
supra note 6, at 417-27 (Part II.A); id. at 517 & n.284; id. at 525 & n.306; id at 650-52 &
nn.615-22; Simon Romero, Leftist Candidate in Ecuador Is Ahead in Vote, Exit Polls Show,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2006, at A8.
According to the letter of the law, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. ECUADOR
CONST. OF 1998, art. 272. In practice, however, constitutional law has been unstable and
relatively easy to manipulate, disregard, and supplant. Ecuador has had twenty constitutions
since becoming a republic. Throughout its history, Ecuador'sjudiciary has failed to enforce and
promote the rule of law through the impartial administration ofjustice. Although the judiciary's
deficiencies have prompted repeated constitutional and other reforms since the return to
democracy in 1979, those reforms have failed to establish an independent judiciary, and the
courts have become notoriously politicized, inefficient, and corrupt. A popular saying, "the law
is for those with a poncho," refers to indigenous peoples in the highlands and reflects the
general belief that the rich and powerful (but not indigenous Ecuadorians) are above the law.
For a fuller discussion of the administration ofjustice in Ecuador and environmental law in the
oil patch, see Kimerling, Oil Frontier in Amazonia, supra note 6; Kimerling, Rio + 10, supra
note 12; Judith Kimerling, International Standards in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields: The
Privatization of Environmental Law, 26 COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 289 (2001) [hereinafter
Kimerling, International Standards]; JUDITH KIMERLING, ?MODELO 0 MITO? TECNOLoGiA DE
PUNTA Y NORMAS INTERNACIONALES EN LOS CAMPOS PETROLERAS DE LA OCCIDENTAL [MODEL
OR MYTH? CUTTING EDGE TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN THE OIL FIELDS
OPERATED BY OCCIDENTAL] (2006) [hereinafter KIMERLING, MODEL OR MYTH?]. In addition
to the legacy of Texaco, the implementation of environmental law in the oil fields has been
hampered by the absence of political will; inadequate financing; lack of technical capacity;
industry influence and resistance to regulation; and the failure of the rule of law and good
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III. Texaco's Operations and the Affected Peoples3'
Oil exploration and production is an industrial activity. Among other
impacts, it generates large quantities of wastes with toxic constituents and
presents ongoing risks of spills. The consortium led by Texaco extracted
nearly 1.5 billion barrels of Amazon crude over a period of twenty-eight
years (1964-1992).3" The operations expanded incrementally, and by the
time Texaco handed over operational responsibility to Petroecuador in 1990,
it had drilled 339 wells in an area that spans roughly one million acres. The
facilities were producing some 213,840 barrels of oil daily from more than
200 wells in sixteen fields. They also generated more than 3.2 million
gallons of toxic wastewater (produced water) every day, virtually all of
which was dumped into the environment via unlined, open-air earthen waste
pits, without treatment or monitoring - a practice that has been generally
banned in the United States by federal law since 1979.33 In addition, they
generated more than 49 million cubic feet of natural gas every day. Some
of the gas was processed for use in the operations; however, most was flared,
or burned as a waste, without temperature or emission controls, depleting a
nonrenewable resource and contaminating the air with greenhouse gases,
precursors of acid rain and ground level ozone, soot, and other contaminants
that probably include dioxin.34
governance generally.
31. For a fuller discussion of the operations, impacts, and affected groups, see Kimerling,
Oil Frontier in Amazonia, supra note 6; KIMERLING, AMAZON CRUDE, supra note 23.
32. The dates include exploration and production; commercial production began in 1972.
Texaco transferred operational responsibility for the trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline to a subsidiary
of Petroecuador on October 1, 1989. On June 30, 1990, another subsidiary of Petroecuador
assumed operational responsibility for exploration and production; Texaco retained a minority
ownership interest in the consortium, remained involved in management activities, and shared
in profits from the operations until its contract with Ecuador expired on June 7, 1992.
33. 40 C.F.R. § 435.32 (2006). The no discharge standard was promulgated by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Water Act and applies to onshore
exploration and production wastes. Before the national standard was enacted, state
environmental laws prohibited discharges of produced water in many locations in the United
States.
34. Produced water (also known as oil field brine) and natural gas are extracted with the
oil and separated in the field. Produced water wastes typically contain hydrocarbons (which
include benzene and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, or PAHs), heavy metals, toxic levels
of salts, and other contaminants. At some locations, they can also contain naturally occurring
radioactive material (NORM). Using government figures, the author has estimated that
Texaco's total produced water discharge was 19.3 billion gallons, and some 1600-16,000
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In addition to routine, willful discharges and emissions, Texaco spilled
nearly twice as much oil as the Exxon Valdez from the main pipeline alone,
mostly in the Amazon basin." Spills from secondary pipelines, flow lines,
tanks, production stations, and other facilities were also frequent and continue
to this day. In contrast to the oil industry's typically energetic response to
spills in the United States, Texaco's response in Ecuador was limited to
shutting off the flow of petroleum into the damaged portion of the pipeline
and allowing the oil already in the line to spill into the environment before
making the necessary repairs. No cleanup activities were undertaken, and no
assistance or compensation was provided to affected communities. Texaco's
pipeline system crosses myriad rivers and streams; as a result, depending on
the location and size of the release, in addition to devastating local impacts,
spills can cause oil slicks on waterways and foul water supplies and fisheries
of downstream communities for scores or even hundreds of kilometers.
Moreover, because spills are not properly cleaned up, they can become
sources of ongoing, chronic pollution in affected watersheds for months or
years.
The areas affected by pollution from spills and deliberate discharges from
the Texaco-Petroecuador facilities are mostly located in the watershed of the
Napo River. The Napo is a major tributary of the Amazon River. In Ecuador,
affected areas in the greater Napo basin can be divided into three sectors: (1)
the lower Napo River and hydraulically-connected lagoons and wetlands, and
waterways that feed into the Napo in Ecuador; (2) the Aguarico River basin,
which flows into the Napo east of Ecuador, in Peru; and (3) the Cononaco
River basin, located in the northern watershed of the Curaray River, which
also flows into the Napo in Peru. The Lower Napo sector is inhabited by
indigenous Kichwa and Huaorani; the Curaray basin is inhabited by
indigenous Huaorani; and the Aguarico basin is inhabited by indigenous
gallons of crude oil were discharged into the environment every day as part of that waste stream.
Additional sources of pollution include the application of untreated oil to roads for dust control
and maintenance purposes, and wastes from drilling and maintenance activities (including well
testing and stimulation activities), among others. Most wastes were dumped into open, unlined
pits (large holes in the ground), hundreds of which continue to contaminate the region.
35. The Exxon Valdez spilled an estimated 10.8 million gallons of oil into the Prince
William Sound. According to figures recorded by MEM, Texaco spilled an estimated 16.8
million gallons from the trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline alone, in thirty major spills, during its tenure
as the pipeline's operator. When adjusted using figures from the World Bank for one of the
spills, the total increases to 19.23 million gallons. The numbers do not include spills from
secondary pipelines, flow lines, tanks and other facilities, which evidently were not recorded
by the government.
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Cofan, Secoya, Siona, and Kichwa. In addition to indigenous residents, the
affected areas are also now inhabited by colonists from Ecuador's highland
and coastal regions and Shuar from Ecuador's southern Amazon, who
migrated to the area in the wake of Texaco's oil development activities.36
The last indigenous Tetetes, now extinct as a people, reportedly fled their
homelands near Lago Agrio, the boom town that sprang up around Texaco's
first commercial field. The Huaorani, Kichwa, Cofan, Siona, and Secoya also
lost lands to infrastructure and the flood of colonists who followed oil roads
into previously inaccessible forests. By 1989, an estimated 2.5 million acres
had been deforested along more than 500 kilometers of roads - most of them
built by Texaco - making oil development the primary engine of
deforestation and dislocation of indigenous peoples in Ecuador's Amazon
region.37
The Huaorani, a semi-nomadic warrior people, tried to drive off the oil
invaders with hardwood spears; the oil crews were afraid. In response,
Texaco collaborated with Ecuador and evangelical Christian missionaries
from the U.S.-based Summer Institute of Linguistics/Wycliffe Bible
Translators to pressure and trick Huaorani clans into leaving the areas where
Texaco wanted to work, pacify the Huaorani, and exterminate their culture
and way of life. Using aircraft supplied by the company, missionaries
contacted and physically removed some 200 Huaorani from the path of the oil
crews and took them to live in a distant Christian settlement located in the
southwestern corner of Huaorani territory. Other Huaorani fled deeper into
the forest, away from Texaco and the missionaries. 38
36. The author works with the Huaorani and Lower Napo River Kichwa.
37. KIMERLING, AMAZONCRUDE, supra note 23, at 75-77 (citing U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev.
(USAID), Natural Resources Management and Conservation of Biodiversity and Tropical
Forests in Ecuador: A Strategy for USAID, Draft 3 (Mar. 1, 1989)). Road construction also
opened previously inaccessible forests to land speculation and logging, and disrupted natural
drainage patterns at many locations.
38. The evangelization of the Huaorani was pioneered by Rachel Saint. Rosemary
Kingsland, a Christian journalist who wrote a book about that work with Saint's cooperation,
described the mood of the time:
The northern [oil] strike was enormous .... Nothing would stop them from going
in now and there was talk of using guns, bombs, flame-throwers. Most of the talk
was wild, but the result would be the same: a war between the oil men and the
Aucas [Huaorani]; a handful of naked savages standing squarely in the middle of
fields of black gold, blocking the progress of the machine age. If it was to be a
question of no oil or no Aucas, there was only one answer.
ROSEMARY KINGSLAND, A SArNT AMONG SAVAGES 126 (1980). For a fuller discussion, see
Kimerling, Oil Frontier in Amazonia, supra note 6; Judith Kimerling, Dislocation,
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One of those groups, the Tagaeri, continued to resist all efforts by outsiders
to contact them. For three decades, they hid in the forest while their ancestral
lands were occupied by strangers. In 2003, they disappeared as a distinct
group; some survivors are believed to be living with another voluntarily
isolated Huaorani clan, the Taromenane. They, too, however, are in danger
of becoming extinct, due to incrementally expanding - and encroaching -
oil exploration and production and violent encounters with loggers who use
the road that Texaco built after the Huaorani were displaced, to enter and
remove wood from the area.
The Huaorani who went to live with the missionaries were told that
Huaorani culture is sinful and savage, and were pressured to change, abandon
their traditions, and adopt the Christian way of life. Among other hardships,
they suffered from severe culture shock and stress, as well as epidemics of
new diseases that sickened, and even killed, many family members. Important
rainforest products were quickly depleted, there were food shortages, and the
Huaorani, whose culture places a high value on independence and sharing, had
to rely on imported foods and medicines obtained by the missionaries. When
groups of Huaorani left the Christian settlements to return to the land of their
ancestors, it was not the same as before. The rainforest that was their home
and source of life had been invaded and degraded by outsiders while they were
away. In addition to Texaco's infrastructure (wells, pipelines, production
stations, and roads), settlers had used the company's roads to colonize
Huaorani lands.
As a result of Texaco's operations, the Huaorani lost their political
sovereignty and sovereignty over their natural resources, and their territory
and access to natural resources were significantly reduced. Many remaining
lands and resources have been degraded and pollution is a continuing problem,
and growing threat, for a number of communities. As a people, the Huaorani
have been thrust into a process of rapid change, loss of territory and natural
resources, environmental degradation, and external pressures that could lead
to their extinction.
The Kichwa who live along the Napo River had already been contacted by
outsiders when Texaco arrived; despite that, they still enjoyed a high level of
Evangelization & Contamination: Amazon Crude and the Huaorani People, in ETHNIC
CONFLICT AND GOVERNANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 70 (Woodrow Wilson Int'l Ctr. for
Scholars, Working Paper No. 215, 1995); ETHEL EMILY WALLIS, THE DAYUMA STORY: LIFE
UNDER AUCA SPEARS (1971); DAVID STOLL, FISHERS OF MEN OR FOUNDERS OF EMPIRE? THE
WYCLIFFE BIBLE TRANSLATORS IN LATIN AMERICA (1982). The estimate of 200 Huaorani is
from anthropologist Laura Rival. Telephone Interview with Laura Rival (Dec. 7, 1994).
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self-determination and sovereignty over their natural resources. Like the
Huaorani, they see the rainforest as the source of life and rely on hunting,
fishing, gathering, and gardening for food and other needs. Like the Huaorani
and other indigenous peoples, their cultures, economies, and well-being
depend on maintaining a high level of environmental quality. As with the
Huaorani, the contamination, degradation, destruction, and depletion of the
land and natural resources on which they depend - including important food
and water supplies - as a result of Texaco's operations, have caused major
cultural, social, and economic disruptions, in addition to ongoing exposures
to toxic substances and new health problems for current and future
generations.
Before Texaco's arrival - indeed, since before written history - the
Huaorani, Napo Kichwa, and other indigenous peoples lived bien (well), in
harmony with their rainforest environment. Oil development violently
disrupted their way of life. In addition, Texaco created poverty among forest
peoples by damaging natural resources that provided them secure, self-reliant,
and sustainable sources of food, water, medicine, and shelter. When Texaco
began its search for oil, the area was unspoiled humid tropical forest. Now,
in the headwaters of an ecosystem that is world-renowned for biological
richness and is believed to contain 20-25% of the world's flowing fresh water,
many families no longer have clean water or enough food.
Dislocation by colonists and by the company have significantly reduced
indigenous territories. In many remaining lands, pollution and the reduction
and fragmentation of forest habitat have degraded, and continue to degrade,
important natural resources, further straining the subsistence base of
indigenous communities and limiting their range for hunting, fishing,
gathering, and gardening. Some forest species, both aquatic and terrestrial,
have become more difficult to find, while others have disappeared. In many
areas, traditional crops, such as manioc and plantain, no longer grow well.
The area hosts an industrial corridor, with boom towns, uncontrolled
colonization, and degraded forests and waters. Pollution saturates the oil
fields in addition to affecting downstream and downwind areas. In some
communities, even the rain is no longer clean; residents say it feels "slippery,
like soap." The damages caused by Texaco are so serious and widespread that
other oil companies now go to great lengths to try to distinguish their
operations: "We are not like Texaco, we use cutting edge technology and
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international standards to protect the environment," has become a common
refrain.39
To varying degrees, indigenous families are moving away from traditional
subsistence activities toward a new cash economy because of damage to
natural resources or because they want cash to buy goods they cannot
themselves produce. As a result, many people substitute carbohydrates for
fish and wildlife proteins in their diet, which can lead to malnutrition and
other health problems. Moreover, when subsistence activities are undermined
or abandoned, traditional indigenous cultures are eroded and dependence on
outsiders increases. Texaco's operations have significantly diminished access
to renewable natural resources and impaired subsistence production without
39. For a study of a prominent corporate initiative claiming to apply cutting edge
technology and international standards in the Ecuadorian Amazon, by a subsidiary of the
U.S.-based oil company, Occidental Petroleum, see Kimerling, Rio + 10, supra note 12
(environmental and community relations standards and practices); Kimerling, International
Standards, supra note 30 (environmental standards and practices); Kimerling, Uncommon
Ground, supra note 12 (community relations standards and practices). The study concludes that
some things are changing in Ecuador's oil frontier, but the companies are still firmly in control
of oil field operations, including environmental and community relations standards and
practices. Voluntary initiatives have led some companies to share some financial benefits of
development with local communities, but a vast gap remains between the promises of
sustainable development and respect for the rights of indigenous peoples to participate in
development and environmental decisions that affect them (as recognized in international law
and Ecuador's constitution) and the reality of development in the oil fields. Some companies
may be raising levels of environmental protection in some areas, at least in the short term; that
is not certain, however, and needs independent verification and long-term monitoring. Two key
questions are whether groundwater resources are protected from contamination by waste
injection activities and buried wastes and pipelines, and whether aging pipelines, well casings,
and other equipment will be properly inspected and maintained. As a general matter, although
voluntary initiatives by oil companies are clearly needed to raise levels of environmental
protection, they are not without peril. The promise to apply "international standards," "cutting
edge technology," "best practice," and/or "corporate responsibility" has become a tool that
multinational oil companies can use to dominate and control environmental information,
decision-making, and implementation; deflect and discourage meaningful oversight; rebuff and
belittle grievances by affected populations; and paint a veneer of environmental excellence and
social responsibility to camouflage business as usual. In addition, they can operate to
undermine the development of national environmental law and capacity in developing nations
like Ecuador, by arbitrarily legitimizing norms that have been defined by special interests, and
reassuring government officials and other stakeholders that standards and practices are
improving. Although the voluntary initiatives cannot be divorced from the social, economic,
and political context in which they operate, a major source of abuse can be linked to the
widespread confusion, outside of industry circles, about the source and substance of applicable
norms.
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providing affected indigenous populations with a means of purchasing
essential goods. The loss of territory and resources has also impaired food
security and food sovereignty and reduced the resource base of indigenous
peoples for sustainable development. As a general matter, distribution of the
costs and benefits of "development" has not been equitable. Indigenous
communities continue to bear a disproportionate share of the costs without
sharing in the benefits or participating in decision-making that affects them.
At the same time, pressures to modernize and adopt the ways of the "civilized"
culture are strong. Alcoholism and alcohol-related violence and accidents are
new but growing problems. In addition, both indigenous and settler residents
affected by Texaco's operations are increasingly concerned about the safety
of their food, water, and air, and many people attribute health problems to the
company's pollution, including malnutrition, skin rashes, memory loss,
headaches, fevers, miscarriage, birth defects, and cancer. These health
problems and concerns are likely just the tip of the iceberg.
Despite a serious decline in their quality of life, most indigenous
communities have managed to maintain a strong sense of identity and culture.
Dependence on the rainforest remains high, even as the quality and quantity
of renewable natural resources continues to grow poorer and sharp inequities
in access to forest resources have emerged. If present trends continue,
however, widespread poverty, hunger, disease and other health problems, and
social disintegration can be expected. To survive as peoples, indigenous
populations must regain control over their remaining territories and reverse the
trend of environmental degradation. Emerging international law recognizes
the special importance of land rights and a healthy environment to the health,
well-being, and cultures of indigenous peoples. Unless remedial action is
taken to clean up and restore damaged areas, prevent further pollution, and
upgrade and repair - or properly close - aging production facilities, the
operations that were launched by Texaco and continued by Petroecuador will
continue to threaten and harm important natural resources, further diminishing
the ability of present and future generations to enjoy the benefits of their
culture and to continu,. or revitalize, a sustainable and self-reliant way of life.
IV Aguinda v. Texaco40
Texaco's production contract expired in 1992, and in November 1993, a
class action lawsuit was filed against Texaco, Inc. in federal court in New
40. See Kimerling, Oil Frontier in Amazonia, supra note 6, at 474-628 (Parts V through
XI) for a detailed analysis of the Aguinda litigation and decision to dismiss.
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York, on behalf of indigenous and colonist residents who have been harmed
by pollution from the company's Ecuador operations. The suit, Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc., was filed by U.S.-based attorneys after they read about the
Amazon Crude study. The case was a toxic tort action, based on common law
claims of negligence, public and private nuisance, trespass, civil conspiracy,
and medical monitoring. It also included an international law claim under the
Alien Tort Claims Act,4 based on alleged (unspecified) violations of the law
of nations, and a claim for equitable relief "to remedy the contamination and
spoilation of their properties, water supplies and environment."42  The
complaint named some seventy-four plaintiffs; the putative class was defined
geographically and estimated to contain at least 30,000 persons.43 Until its
merger with Chevron in 2001, Texaco's corporate headquarters was in White
Plains, New York, and the complaint alleged that decisions directing the
harmful operations were made there."
The complaint did not identify all of the affected indigenous peoples or
distinguish their claims and injuries from those of the colonists, who are also
adversely affected by the pollution and included among the named plaintiffs
and putative class. Similarly, it did not include claims based on the special
rights of indigenous peoples. In press releases and other public relations and
advocacy activities related to the case, however, the plaintiffs' lawyers and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that support the lawsuit often give the
impression that all of the plaintiffs are indigenous Amazonian peoples. As a
result, confusion about the plaintiffs and origins of the litigation have
characterized many of the extensive press reports about the case, and it has
commonly been described as a lawsuit brought by "Indians" or "indigenous
people from the rainforest. ' 45
In response to the lawsuit, Texaco denied any wrongdoing and vigorously
fought the legal action. In submissions to the court and in the media, Texaco
alleged that the operations had complied with Ecuadorian law and
then-prevailing industry practices. Moreover, the company argued, it had not
operated in Ecuador since 1990, and any legal claims should be pursued there
instead of in the United States. In court, Texaco also denied parent company
control over the operations, which, as noted above, were carried out by a
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
42. Complaint 90, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1993),
1993 WL 13148394 [hereinafter Aguinda Complaint].
43. Id. 30.
44. Id. 2; see also id. 28.
45. See, e.g., Paul Braverman, Tilting at Texaco, AM. LAWYER, Oct. 2001, at 98, 100-01.
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wholly-owned subsidiary, Texaco Petroleum Company, in a consortium,
initially with Gulf and subsequently with Petroecuador. This effort to distance
the parent company from the Ecuador operations and assert that it had no role
in environmental management there contradicted both the image that Texaco
Petroleum had cultivated in Ecuador (of a leading international company
based in the United States) and the image commonly promoted by Texaco,
Inc. in public relations materials and responses to concerned consumers and
NGOs before it was sued (of an industry leader engaged in worldwide
operations that is committed to environmentally responsible practices
wherever it operates). Texaco's legal submissions further alleged that Texaco,
Inc.'s only involvement in the challenged operations was an indirect
investment in a fourth tier subsidiary; emphasized that Texaco Petroleum held
a minority (37.5%) interest in the consortium from 1977 until June 1992,
when its interest ended entirely; and contended that environmental practices
were heavily regulated by Petroecuador and Ecuador.
Outside court, Texaco and Ecuador moved quickly to negotiate issues
raised by the lawsuit, in what ABC News Nightline later called an "exit
agreement." They signed a series of agreements in 1994-1995 ("Remediation
Contract"). Under the accord, Texaco agreed to implement limited
environmental remediation work; make payments to Ecuador for
socio-economic compensation projects; and negotiate contributions to public
works with municipal governments of four boom towns that sprang up around
the company's operations and, in the wake ofAguinda v. Texaco, sued Texaco
Petroleum in Ecuador. In exchange, the government and Petroecuador agreed
to release and liberate Texaco Petroleum and Texaco (and their subsidiaries
and successors) from all claims, obligations, and liability to the Ecuadorian
State and national oil company "related to contamination" from the
operations. The agreement did not include a price tag, but Texaco
subsequently reported that it spent forty million dollars on the remediation
program.
The "remedial work" undertaken by the company, however, was extremely
limited in scope and largely cosmetic.46 It did not contain or reverse the tragic
46. For example, the scope of work did not include measures to investigate and remedy air
pollution, contamination in ground or surface waters, pollution from oil-soaked roads, or most
spill sites; evaluate and address impacts on natural resources; or assess the integrity of aging
pipelines and well casings and take corrective action, where needed, to prevent leaks and spills.
Most of the work, which began in October 1995 and was completed in August 1998, was
designed to "close" abandoned waste pits at well sites. However, hundreds of waste pits (at
both well sites and production stations) were omitted from the scope of work, as was most
offsite contamination at those locations. In addition, the reliability of the closure procedure
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environmental legacy of the operations or benefit affected rural populations.
Indeed, the accord, which was negotiated behind closed doors, without
meaningful participation by affected communities, transparency, or other
democratic safeguards, seems more like an agreement between polluters to
limit cleanup requirements and lower and divide their costs than a remediation
program based on a credible assessment of environmental conditions and
measures needed to remedy them. The final release of Texaco and its
corporate family reflects the enduring political and economic power of the
company and the selective application of the law in the oil frontier. Inasmuch
as it liberates the company from environmental obligations to the state, it also
raises serious questions of law and legitimacy.
In court, after nine years of litigation, Texaco's efforts to dismiss the case
were successful, and the Aguinda plaintiffs were essentially told to go home
and sue in Ecuador. The case was dismissed on the ground of forum non
conveniens, a doctrine that allows a court to dismiss a case that could be tried
in a different court, in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the
parties. When a federal court applies theforum non conveniens doctrine, it
first determines whether there is an alternative forum and then it balances
private and public interest factors to determine which forum is more
convenient. Private interest factors include access to evidence, the cost of
obtaining the attendance of willing witnesses, the availability of compulsory
process for unwilling witnesses, the possibility of viewing the premises, and
other practical concerns. Public interest factors include local interest in the
controversy, possible problems in the application of foreign law, the fairness
of imposing jury duty on residents of a jurisdiction that has little to do with
the controversy, and other public concerns.
In Aguinda, the district court ruled that Ecuador's courts provide an
alternative forum and that the balance of private and public interest factors
"tips overwhelmingly in favor of dismissal. ' 7 Despite the fact that Texaco's
headquarters was just a few miles from the courthouse where the case was
described in a technical report that Texaco provided to the author is questionable, at best, and
according to a number of witnesses and reports, it was not followed at many locations, and
contaminated liquids were dumped into waterways without sampling or treatment; pits
containing high levels of petroleum were backfilled without removing or treating the oil; and
some of the oil and contaminated soils and vegetation that were removed were burned in open
fires, dumped in nearby forests, or buried in unlined holes in the ground. For a fuller
discussion, see Kimerling, Oil Frontier in Amazonia, supra note 6, at 493-514 (Part VII).
47. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
[Vol. 3 1
No. 2] TRANSNA TIONAL OPERATIONS, BI-NA TIONAL INJUSTICE 467
filed, the judge concluded that the case has "everything to do with Ecuador
and nothing to do with the United States."48
Some of the facts used by the court to support its legal analysis are
uncontested. For example, there were no allegations of injury in the United
States; Texaco built and operated the facilities; and after operations began,
Ecuador acquired majority ownership of the assets and continued to operate
them after Texaco Petroleum's contract expired. Other facts, however, are in
dispute. One area that is especially germane relates to control of the
operations. While not determinative, in and of itself, of the legal questions,
the factual issue of where decisions were made about the technology and
practices that caused the pollution, and who made them, was a material
element of the analysis of both private and public interest factors and clearly
colored the decision to dismiss.
The proposition, advocated by Texaco and accepted by the court, that
Ecuadorians controlled the relevant decisions, that no one from Texaco or
anyone else operating out of the United States made any material decisions or
was involved in designing, directing, guiding, or assisting the activities that
caused the pollution, and that environmental practices were heavily regulated
by Ecuador, is a recurring theme. The court also distinguished Texaco from
Texaco Petroleum, the subsidiary that operated in Ecuador. That distinction,
and the portrait of Texaco Petroleum as basically an Ecuadorian company
whose operations were far removed from the parent, is dramatically different
from the image of Texaco in Ecuador and the impression there that the State
had contracted with the U.S. company, Texaco. It is also at odds with the
portrait cultivated by Texaco prior to the litigation, of a multinational industry
leader that transferred world class technology to Ecuador. Altogether, the
Aguinda court's depiction of Texaco's role in the operations is clearly
incongruous with the reality of oil development in Ecuador, including the
environmental law vacuum and culture of impunity in the oil frontier, the
experience of Amazonian peoples and other Ecuadorians with the company,
and the portrait cultivated by Texaco during its tenure there - the
triumphalist chapter in the history of oil in Ecuador.4 9
48. Id.
49. The first judge to consider Texaco's motions to dismiss (Judge Broderick) reserved
decision and ordered limited discovery. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1994 WL
142006 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994), adhered to in Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 282
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). Although the use and analysis of the discovery by plaintiffs' counsel is
disappointing, the exclusive reliance by the district court judge who dismissed the case (Judge
Rakoft) on self-serving allegations by the defendant denying responsibility for environmental
protection, without contemporaneous supporting documentation or live testimony that could be
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The Aguinda court's determination that an adequate alternative forum
exists was also colored by questionable factual assumptions, including
erroneous and unsupported findings of fact about the history of litigation in
Ecuador's courts. Specifically, the court found that several plaintiffs had
already recovered judgments against Texaco Petroleum and Petroecuador in
Ecuadorian courts for claims arising out of the facts alleged by the Aguinda
plaintiffs, a finding that is clearly erroneous.5" A related finding, that
Ecuadorian oil field workers had won personal injury lawsuits against Texaco
Petroleum based on claims of alleged negligence, is not supported by evidence
in the Aguinda litigation record and is contradicted by the historical record."'
A third major finding, that the description of systemic shortcomings in
Ecuador's legal and judicial system by the U.S. Department of State in its
Country Reports on human rights is largely limited to cases involving
confrontations between the police and political protestors, is also erroneous
and suggests a lack of candor by the court. 2
tested by cross-examination, is also disappointing. In the decision to dismiss, Judge Rakoff
repeatedly rebuked the plaintiffs for failing to prove their allegations that Texaco designed and
directed the operations from the United States but appeared to concentrate on the document and
deposition evidence and did not mention affidavits and declarations (submitted by plaintiffs'
counsel and amicus curiae) by Ecuadorians who were involved in the operations which
supported the plaintiffs' allegations.
Notwithstanding the limits of their showing, the plaintiffs raised genuine issues of fact, and
there can be little doubt that if the Court had questioned the defendants' allegations and viewed
the disputed facts and ambiguities in a light more favorable to the plaintiffs, that approach,
while not necessarily leading to a different outcome on the motion to dismiss, would have
materially altered the analysis of both private and public interest factors. Despite considerable
gaps in the litigation record, for the purpose of a forum non conveniens motion, there is no
question that many evidentiary roads lead to the United States, and a number of private and
public interest factors favor litigation in the plaintiffs' chosen forum. In addition, there is
significant, albeit incomplete, evidence that the harmful operations were part of an international
corporate enterprise that relied on the parent company's technical expertise, financial and
human resources, and image and prestige as a U.S.-based multinational corporation.
For a discussion of the image promoted by Texaco during its tenure in Ecuador, based on
documents that are not included in the litigation record but which offer a candid,
contemporaneous view of the relevant issues in the company's own words, see Kimerling, Oil
Frontier in Amazonia, supra note 6, at 613-20.
50. For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling, Oil Frontier in Amazonia, supra note 6, at
534-39.
51. Id. at 539-44.
52. Remarkably, the court misquotes the State Department report. Judge Rakoff evidently
reviewed reports issued in 1999 and 2000, describing human rights practices during 1998 and
1999, respectively. Both reports state that "[t]he most fundamental human rights abuse [in
Ecuador] stems from shortcomings in the politicized, inefficient, and corrupt legal and judicial
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system." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ECUADOR COUNTRY REPORT FOR PRACTICES IN 1999, at 1-2
(2000); U.S. DEP'TOF STATE, ECUADOR COUNTRY REPORT FOR PRACTICES IN 1998, at 1 (1999).
However, the report (issued in 2000) is quoted by the court as "describ[ing] Ecuador's legal and
judicial systems as 'politicized, inefficient, and sometimes corrupt' so far as certain 'human
rights' practices are concerned." Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 545 (emphasis added). The
misquotation is especially troubling because the same statement was quoted by Judge Rakoff,
correctly, on two prior occasions, and the litigation record suggests that the court allotted
appreciable attention to considering its proper meaning.
After a political crisis in Ecuador made the headlines (the ouster of President Jamil Mahuad
by extra-constitutional means and his replacement initially by a military-civilian junta that
included a former Supreme Court judge and, subsequently, by Vice President Gustavo Noboa,
who became Ecuador's fifth president in four years), Judge Rakoff consulted the State
Department Country Report on Ecuador sua sponte and reopened the Aguinda record. In a
Memorandum Order, he quoted the report (issued in 1999), correctly; explained that the court
could not "ignore without further inquiry a statement from a department of the U.S. Government
that so fully casts doubt on the independence and impartiality of the principal courts to which
the defendant seeks to remit" the case; and invited the parties and Ecuador to supplement the
record with submissions regarding whether Ecuador's courts "might reasonably be expected to
exercise" the "modicum of independence and impartiality" necessary to an adequate alternative
forum. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 745 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
31, 2000). The court also asked the State Department to clarify the scope of the statement.
Letter from Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge, to Edward Scarvalone, Assistant United
States Attorney (May 9, 2000). The court's query correctly quoted the statement again,
described it as "a primary conclusion" of the human rights report, and observed that it had been
repeated in the report issued in 2000. However, the court added, "the evidence set forth in the
report to support this strong statement largely relates to criminal cases," which are substantially
different from the civil claims of environmental damage in Aguinda; "[a]ccordingly, the Court
would appreciate any written clarifications the State Department could give as to the scope of
the statements" and any information regarding whether Ecuador's courts would be able to
adjudicate Aguinda "in a fair and impartial manner." Even in "the very different context" of
Aguinda, "the Court does not believe that.., it can ignore without further inquiry a statement
from a department of the U.S. Government that so fully casts doubt on the independence and
impartiality" of Ecuador's courts. Id. The response by the State Department did not backpedal
on the statement or doubts it casts on Ecuador's courts, nor did it corroborate Judge Rakoffs
intimations that litigation based on environmental claims could somehow be distinguished from
the proceedings and circumstances that caused the agency to describe Ecuador's "legal and
judicial system" as "politicized, inefficient, and corrupt." In a letter to the court, the State
Department explained that, although U.S. Embassies do not "engage in an exhaustive review
of the host nation's judicial system in civil cases," the portions of the human rights reports that
discuss the judiciary are not limited to the criminal arena; "rather, they reflect conclusions
drawn from the totality ofthe Embassy's exposure to, and analysis of, the host country's judicial
system generally," and the department regards the reports "as an authoritative reference source."
Letter from Paolo Di Rosa, Attorney Advisor, Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State,
Western Hemisphere Affairs, to Edward Scarvelone, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney (June 8,
2000), submitted to the Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Court, Aguinda v.
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Related findings - that there was no evidence of impropriety by Texaco
or any member of the Consortium in any priorjudicial proceeding in Ecuador
and that numerous cases were pending against multinational corporations
without evidence of corruption - are of limited probative value in the
absence of meaningful information about the outcomes of those proceedings.
The parsed language of the findings appears to evade concerns related to
racism and discrimination against indigenous peoples in Ecuador and the
culture of impunity in the oil fields.5" Although the Aguinda court's focus on
the litigation record in Ecuador is understandable, as is its preference to avoid
Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y.) [hereinafter Dep't of State Submission]. A copy of
the most recent human rights report was attached to the letter, as well as a copy of the Country
Commercial Guide for Ecuador, prepared annually by the Embassy with assistance from several
U.S. government agencies "to provide guidance on the commercial environment in the host
nation." Id. The guide described Ecuador's judicial system as "dysfunctional" and said that
long term reform is "desperately needed," in addition to echoing the language in the human
rights reports and cautioning investors about corruption in the courts and other public
institutions. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Country Commercial Guide, Ecuador FY 2000, in Dep't
of State Submission, supra, tab C, at chs. II.A-3, III.C-5, VII.G-7-8, VII.L-13-14, VII.C-4.
The Aguinda court's query to the State Department can arguably be seen as an invitation to
distinguish Aguinda from the "strong statement" in the human rights reports ascribing serious
and systemic deficiencies to Ecuador's courts. After the State Department declined to do so,
Judge Rakoff evidently took on that task himself, apparently to the point of editing the
statement. In addition to mis-quoting the State Department, the court added a qualifier to the
statement and a new interpretation that limits its scope to a narrow class of cases: "While the
State Department nonetheless continues to describe Ecuador's legal and judicial systems as
'politicized, inefficient, and sometimes corrupt' so far as certain 'human rights' practices are
concerned, [citation omitted], this is based, as the Country Reports make clear, on cases largely
involving confrontations between the police and political protestors." Aguinda, 142 F. Supp.
2d at 545. The qualifier added by the court, however, is contradicted by most of the cases in
the human rights reports. Oil Frontier in Amazonia, supra note 6, at 555-62. It is also at odds
with the clarification by the State Department and the court's initial thesis, and is further
contradicted by a more detailed report on human rights in Ecuador by the Organization of
American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), portions of which
were submitted to the Aguinda court by the plaintiffs. See Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96 doc. 10 rev. 1 (Apr. 24, 1997);
Plaintiffs' (New) Exhibits in Support of Their Memorandum of Law Responsive to This Court's
January 31, 2000 Memorandum Order, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 9, 2000).
53. In addition, corruption is notoriously difficult to prove and commonly goes unreported,
even when parties are convinced that it has influenced judicial proceedings. Moreover, many
plaintiffs in Ecuador do not receive an adjudication of their claims, illustrating the truth of the
adage, "justice delayed is justice denied." Significantly, the support in the litigation record for
those findings was limited to affidavits by Texaco Petroleum attorneys and experts.
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reliance on generalized allegations of corruption, legal precedents to support
the court's sanguine view of litigation in Ecuador evidently do not exist.
Despite a multitude of submissions by Texaco, including ample, but vague,
allegations about the litigation record in Ecuador, a gaping hole remained: no
final judgment by a court of law in favor of a plaintiff against an oil company
based on environmental injuries, or against Texaco (or Texaco Petroleum) in
any lawsuit, was submitted by the defendant. The only judgment in the record
in favor of a plaintiff- an action by a municipality against Petroecuador and
its insurer for damages caused by an oil spill from a former Texaco facility -
was vacated on appeal by Ecuador's Supreme Court, which also assessed costs
for the defendants' attorneys against the judges who ruled for the plaintiff in
the unprecedented environmental action.54 As a general matter, the notion
implicit in the court's analysis, that environmental lawsuits against
ChevronTexaco and Petroecuador in Ecuador could somehow be insulated
from the social and political context in which they operate and enjoy
immunity from systemic deficiencies in the legal and judicial systems, is
implausible. Both the historical record and the Aguinda litigation record make
54. See Oral Summary Proceeding, Municipality Joya de las Sachas v. Petroecuador
(Supreme Court of Justice, Court of Administration Litigation, Oct. 28, 1998), File No. 1254,
No. 172-97 (Ecuador), in Affidavit of Dr. Adolfo Callejas Ribadeneira at Exhibit L (Dec. 28,
1998), in Texaco Inc.'s Appendix of Affidavits, Documents and Other Authorities in Support
of Its Renewed Motions to Dismiss, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
11, 1999) (vacating the proceeding because it should not have gone forward using rules of
procedure that allow oral summary proceedings in certain cases, and assessing costs of five
million sucres for the defendant's attorneys, to be paid by the lower court judge who adjudicated
the case and the judges of the intermediate appellate court who signed the majority opinion
upholding the judgment in favor of the plaintiff); see also Sworn Statement by Mr. Luis Tobar
Sinchez 19 (Mar. 27,2000), in Plaintiffs' Exhibits (Volume II) in Support of Plaintiffs' Reply
Memorandum of Law in Further Response to This Court's January 31, 2000 Memorandum
Order, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2000) (affidavit by
attorney who represented the plaintiff municipality, stating that municipal officials decided not
to pursue the case after the judgment was overturned because they concluded that "it was
impossible to win an action of that sort"; even if they won again in the local court in an ordinary
proceeding, the judgment would not survive appeal by Petroecuador to superior courts in Quito
due to the company's political influence there).
The Aguinda court's demand for highly particularized evidence of corruption - to defeat
a motion for which the defendant bears the burden of proof- set a burdensome and arguably
impossible standard for the plaintiffs, especially considering the difficulty of proving corruption
in specific cases, the lack of transparency in Ecuador's courts, and the failure of the discovery
order to facilitate access by plaintiffs to that type of information. The absence ofjudgments in
the record to support Texaco's conclusory allegations seems more revealing than the absence
of evidence of corruption by Texaco and other multinationals in specific lawsuits.
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it clear that the road to effective judicial reform - and the rule of law - in
Ecuador will be long and difficult. In the oil frontier in Amazonia, law and
politics continue to be characterized by gross inequities that favor oil company
interests at the expense of indigenous peoples, campesinos, and the
environment.5
The Aguinda plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
However, because forum non conveniens involves the exercise of discretion
by the trial court, appellate courts have limited powers of review. In this case,
the Second Circuit found no abuse of discretion.56 In a footnote, the appellate
court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the district court judge, Jed
Rakoff, should have recused himself. The plaintiffs had asked the judge to
disqualify himself from further proceedings in Aguinda after they learned that
he attended "an all expense paid resort trip and 'seminar' at a ranch in
Montana sponsored by The Foundation for Research on Economics & the
Environment (FREE). FREE is "funded partially by Defendant Texaco, Inc,"
and Texaco's former Chairman of the Board, Alfred DeCrane, was "one of the
principal speakers at the 'seminar."' 57 In another footnote, the Second Circuit
55. Another finding relied on by the Aguinda court, that Ecuador had recently taken steps
to further the independence of itsjudiciary, was technically accurate. The effectiveness of those
reforms had not been demonstrated, however, and subsequent political upheavals (resulting in
the unconstitutional disbanding of Ecuador's Supreme Court, the installation and ouster of
another Supreme Court, and the apparently-unconstitutional removal of the President of
Ecuador) show that the Aguinda court's optimistic view was premature. That outcome is not
surprising because the Aguinda court's expectations turned a blind eye to the historical and
political context of the reform efforts, including the repeated failure of previous reforms to
establish an impartial judiciary and combat corruption generally. Another finding - that there
is little chance of corruption or undue influence in lawsuits byAguinda plaintiffs because they
will be subject to public and political scrutiny - is similarly speculative and sanguine, and has
also been called into question by subsequent events. (Those events relate to the effort by a group
of Kichwa and Huaorani to sue ChevronTexaco and Texaco Petroleum in Ecuador, discussed
infra.) A final finding relied on by the Aguinda court to determine that an alternative forum
exists, that other U.S. courts have found Ecuador to be an adequate forum, is supported by case
law but offers little reassurance because it appears to reflect the relatively light burden on
defendants to show the existence of an alternative forum under the forum non conveniens
doctrine, among other factors, and does not indicate whether plaintiffs in the cited cases have
in fact obtained an impartial hearing and adequate remedy in Ecuador's courts.
56. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
57. Motion for Disqualification and Supporting Memorandum of Law, Aguinda v. Texaco,
Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2000); Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 480 n.4. Plaintiffs'
motion was prompted by an op-ed in the New York Times by Abner Mikva, a former chiefjudge
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which criticized free trips by federal
judges "to resort locations for legal seminars paid for by corporations and foundations that have
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declined to rule on whether the Alien Tort Claims Act encompasses the
environmental claims in Aguinda, or whether it expresses a strong U.S. policy
interest in providing a forum for litigation. Even if those legal arguments
were accepted, said the note, the private and public interest factors would
nonetheless require the appellate court to uphold the judgment of the district
court.5"
In its review of the district court judgment, the Second Circuit did not
repeat all of the detailed factual rulings discussed above, but it quoted Judge
Rakoff s general finding that Aguinda "has everything to do with Ecuador and
nothing to do with the United States," and apparently relied on at least some
of the more specific findings to reject the plaintiffs' appeal. 9 The Second
Circuit also found it "significant" that Ecuador and Petroecuador could be
joined in a lawsuit in Ecuador but not in a U.S. forum, because they enjoy
sovereign immunity here.60 That factor was also cited by the district court and
is related to Texaco's contention that Ecuador and Petroecuador had primary
an interest in federal litigation on environmental topics ... [and] devoted to so-called
environmental education." Abner Mikva, Op-Ed, The Wooing ofOur Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
28, 2000, at A 17; Affidavit of Counsel Crist6bal Bonifaz 2-4 (Aug. 31, 2000), in Motion for
Disqualification and Supporting Memorandum of Law, supra. Judge Rakoffdenied the motion
to recuse, saying that he did not know that FREE "had apparently received some minor portion
of its funding from Texaco," that the seminar he attended was not funded by Texaco, and that
he had not discussed the case there. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 438, 439
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). Plaintiffs then petitioned the Second Circuit for a Writ of Mandamus
directing Judge Rakoff to recuse himself; the court of appeals denied the petition and plaintiffs'
petition for rehearing en banc. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 241 F.3d 194, 198 (2d Cir. 2001). The
following day, Judge Rakoff dismissed Aguinda (for the second time) in a blistering opinion,
discussed supra.
58. Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 476 (quoting Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 537).
59. Aguinda, 303 F.3d 470. On remand, the district court conditioned dismissal on
Texaco's agreement to submit to jurisdiction in Ecuador and waive defenses based on any
statute of limitations that expired between the date the case began and sixty days after dismissal.
Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 539; see also Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir.
1998)(vacating dismissal of Aguinda and Jota, a related class action filed by the Aguinda
plaintiffs' lawyers in 1994 on behalf of Peruvian plaintiffs, and remanding for reconsideration).
The Second Circuit extended that time period from sixty days to one year. Aguinda, 303 F.3d
at 478-79. Remarkably, in its answer to a new lawsuit filed in Ecuador by forty-six of the
Aguinda plaintiffs and two additional plaintiffs, discussed infra, ChevronTexaco argues that
courts in Ecuador do not have jurisdiction over ChevronTexaco and that the company is not
bound by the Second Circuit decision or Texaco's stipulations in Aguinda because
ChevronTexaco "is not the [legal] successor of Texaco Inc." under U.S. law. Answer to the
Complaint filed by Maria Aguinda Salazar v. ChevronTexaco Corp. 1.1-.4,1.8, IV. 1, IV.3-.4,
IV.5-.9, Superior Court of Nueva Loja (Ecuador) (Oct. 21, 2003).
60. Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 479.
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control of the challenged operations,6 and, as a result, it would be unfair for
a lawsuit to proceed on the plaintiffs' claims without Petroecuador. Reliance
on that factor to favor litigation in an Ecuadorian forum, however, now
appears misplaced. Despite representing to the Aguinda court that
"Petroecuador can and will be brought into these lawsuits if they are filed in
Ecuador," "[y]ou can't try these cases without having Petroecuador present,"
and "[i]t just is almost a matter of fundamental fairness,"62 ChevronTexaco
has not impleaded Petroecuador in the lawsuit filed in Ecuador by a group of
Aguinda plaintiffs after their New York case was dismissed. Instead,
ChevronTexaco and Texaco Petroleum filed an arbitration claim against
Petroecuador in New York, seeking "to enforce their rights" in the
consortium's operating agreement and require Petroecuador to indemnify all
fees, costs, and expenses related to that lawsuit, "including any final judgment
that may be rendered against ChevronTexaco in Ecuador."63
In response, Ecuador and Petroecuador sued ChevronTexaco, Texaco
Petroleum, and the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in New York
State Supreme Court, seeking to stay the arbitration proceeding based on the
assertion that Ecuador and Petroecuador had never agreed to arbitrate disputes
with Texaco. The defendants removed the case to federal district court, the
same court that had dismissed Aguinda. The federal court dismissed the
action insofar as it named AAA as a defendant and allowed the plaintiffs to
file an amended complaint. The amended complaint raised additional claims
and requested a ten-part declaratory judgment that effectively waived
sovereign immunity. ChevronTexaco and Texaco Petroleum counterclaimed,
alleging breach of contract and failure to indemnify an implied agent, and
seeking damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. In March 2005,
61. Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 551.
62. Transcript of Argument on Renewed Motions to Dismiss Before the Honorable Jed S.
Rakoff, United States District Judge at 23-24, Aguinda v. Texaco, No. CV-93-7527 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 1, 1999); see also, e.g., Texaco Inc.'s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Renewed
Motions to Dismiss Based on Forum Non Conveniens and International Comity at 31-32,
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 1999).
63. Press Release, ChevronTexaco, ChevronTexaco and Texaco Petroleum Company File
Arbitration Claim to Enforce Petroecuador's Obligations Under Joint Operating Agreement:
Claim Asserts Petroecuador Required to Pay All Costs Associated With Lawsuit Against
ChevronTexaco in Ecuador (June 15, 2004), available at http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/
ecuador/en/press__releases/2004-06-15_file arbitration.asp. The post-dismissal arbitration claim
not only raises questions about Texaco's candor with the Aguinda court but also makes a
mockery of the company's general argument that litigation in New York is inconvenient.
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the court temporarily stayed the arbitration proceeding while that lawsuit,
Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., proceeds.'
V In The Wake ofAguinda: Indigenous Kichwa and Huaorani Unite to
Protect and Assert Their Claims
AfterAguinda was dismissed, the plaintiffs' lawyers vowed to continue the
litigation in Ecuador. In a new spin they declared victory, calling the outcome
a landmark decision that, for the first time, ordered a giant oil company to
submit to the authority of national courts in a developing country and comply
with any judgment that might be imposed.6" In May 2003, forty-six of the
Aguinda plaintiffs and two additional plaintiffs filed a new lawsuit against
ChevronTexaco in the Superior Court of Justice ofNueva Loj a (Lago Agrio).
The plaintiffs are from four communities: one Secoya and one colonist
community in Sucumbios Province and one Kichwa and one colonist
community in neighboring Orellana Province. The allegations of injury,
however, extend far beyond the plaintiffs and their communities to include all
affected areas in the two provinces, and the request for relief is presented "as
members of the affected communities and as guardians of those communities
recognized collective rights." The affected population whose rights are
allegedly being asserted includes "the five indigenous peoples of the area," the
Cofan, Huaorani, Kichwa, Secoya, and Siona, as well as colonists. However,
no Cofan, Huaorani, Siona, or Napo River Kichwa are included among the
plaintiffs, and no damages or other relief are requested directly for the
affected communities or indigenous peoples, or even for the plaintiffs. 6
64. Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Amended Complaint, Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 04 CV 8378 (Dec., 8,
2004); Defendants ChevronTexaco Corporation's & Texaco Petroleum Company's Answer to
Amended Complaint and Counterclaim, Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 04 CV
8378 (Jan. 10, 2005) [hereinafter ChevronTexaco Answer & Counterclaim].
65. See, e.g., Kevin Koenig, ChevronTexaco on Trial, WORLDWATCH, Jan.-Feb. 2004, at
10, 11 (article by Amazon Watch staff repeating a number of contentions by the plaintiffs'
lawyers).
66. Plaintiffs' Complaint to the President of the Superior Court of Justice of Nueva Loja
(Lago Agrio) at III, VI, Maria Aguinda Salazar v. ChevronTexaco Corp. (May 7, 2003)
[hereinafter Lago Agrio Complaint] (on file with author). The Ecuadorian lawyers who
represent the plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio case were retained by the Aguinda v. Texaco plaintiffs'
attorneys. Declaration of Crist6bal Bonifaz in Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion to
Proceed With Action Using Pseudonyms, 11, Doe v. Texaco, No. C 06-2820 (N.D.Cal. June
9, 2006) [hereinafter Declaration of Crist6bal Bonifaz].
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Instead, the lawsuit seeks a judicial determination of the costs of a
comprehensive environmental remediation - including removal of all
pollution that threatens human health and the environment, restoration of
natural resources, and medical monitoring - and an order directing
ChevronTexaco to pay the full amount to a local NGO, Frente de Defensa de
la Amazonia (Amazon Defense Front), known locally as "Frente," which
would then "apply" the funds for the ends determined in the judgment. The
complaint also claims a 10% share of the remedial monies for the plaintiffs,
but requests that those funds also be paid to Frente.67
Frente was founded in 1994 by a group of colonists in Lago Agrio, to
establish a local institution to administer monies that they expected to be
forthcoming from Aguinda v. Texaco. Led by Luis Yanza, an urbano (urban
colonist) who heard about the case in a news report on the radio, Frente has
developed close ties with the plaintiffs' lawyers and some external NGOs, but
has no experience with environmental cleanup, natural resources restoration,
or medical services. Most importantly, its efforts to claim a monopoly of
representation of all people(s) affected by Texaco and to manage local politics
in an undemocratic fashion have alienated many people in the affected
communities,6" and have been challenged by a growing number of Kichwa and
67. Lago Agrio Complaint, supra note 66, at VI. The decision to award the relief to Frente,
which is not a plaintiff, was apparently made by the lawyers without consulting or informing
the affected communities. Although Frente has developed alliances with a handful of Cofan,
Secoya, and Siona, community involvement in those alliances appears to be limited, at most,
and the organization is dominated by colonists.
68. In 1998, Frente issued resolutions "in the name and in representation of the
organizations and communities affected" by Texaco, designating exclusive "official
spokespersons" for Aguinda in Ecuador. The resolutions also demanded that any initiative by
outside groups to help communities affected by Texaco or to "follow" the case be approved by,
and coordinated with, Frente and another colonist in Lago Agrio. Amazon Defense Front,
Resoluciones Caso Texaco [Texaco Case Resolutions] (Dec. 12, 1998) (on file with author);
Amazon Defense Front, Resoluciones [Resolutions] (Feb. 12, 1999) (on file with author). None
of the spokespersons were named plaintiffs; two out of six were urban colonists (who are not
members of affected communities or part of the putative class).
In 2001, in response to a resurgence of local organizing in the wake of disquieting news that
the Aguinda plaintiffs' lawyers were negotiating a possible settlement agreement with Texaco
behind closed doors, Frente organized the "Assembly of Delegates of the People Affected by
Texaco's Petroleum Operations (Assembly of Delegates)," to create the appearance of a
"democratic" body that could claim to represent the affected communities and be used to
buttress efforts by Frente to build support for a settlement proposal; legitimize decisions made
by the lawyers about a possible agreement; speak in the name of all affected groups; administer
monies from the litigation; and act as intermediary and gatekeeper between the affected
communities and external stakeholders. Despite its impressive name, the "Assembly of
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Huaorani, who were not consulted by the decision-makers in the Lago Agrio
Delegates" has limited participation and is evidently dominated by Frente. At a meeting
presided over by Frente, delegates approved "Regulations" declaring that the "Assembly of
Delegates" - comprised of twenty-two individuals "from the oil fields" who ostensibly
represent colonist communities and one representative each of the Siona, Secoya, Cofan, and
Huaorani organizations - "shall be the organic authority for decision-making and
representation of all persons affected by the environmental, social, and cultural impacts
provoked by Texaco." The distribution of"delegates from the oil fields" is based on the number
of wells in the field and evidently does not take into account factors such as population, length
of residence, or land ownership. Reglamento de la Asamblea de Delegados de los Afectados
Por las Operaciones Petroleras de Texaco y del Comite Ejecutivo [Regulations of the Assembly
of Delegates of the People Affected by Texaco's Petroleum Operations and of the Executive
Committee] at pmbl., arts. 2-4 (Apr. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Regulations] (on file with author).
The rules for decision-making by the "assembly" turn basic principles of due process and
decision-making by consensus on their head, run roughshod over the rights of indigenous
peoples to participate in decisions that affect them, and disrespect related community norms and
aspirations for self-determination. They do not provide for consultation with, or ratification of,
decisions by affected communities. Although they state that decisions "shall be taken by
unanimous agreement," they also authorize decision-making by a simple majority of delegates
who are present if there is no consensus, and decree that such decisions are "obligatory for all
of the affected communities and organizations." Similarly, the "required" quorum is "one-half
plus one" (fourteen) delegates, but if a quorum is not present, the meeting "shall be installed one
hour later, with the number of delegates who are present," if "no fewer than one-third" (nine
delegates) are present. As a result, "obligatory" decisions can be adopted (1) over the objection
of as many as twelve members of the twenty-six person assembly; or (2) by as few as five
persons, in the absence of up to two-thirds of the delegates (including all of the indigenous
delegates). The potential for abuse, and due process violations with regard to legal rights, is
compounded by the absence of provisions for notice or for recording and disclosing the
particulars of a vote and the identity of decision-makers when "obligatory" decisions are
adopted. Id. art. 9.
The "Regulations" are written in legalistic language and purport to rest on the "authority"
of "the communities and organizations affected by Texaco" but were read to the group at its
second meeting and hurriedly approved, without consulting the affected communities. The
entire process reportedly took about thirty minutes, and some delegates did not vote. Frente
subsequently published the "Regulations;" however, the text simply "certifies" that it was "read,
discussed and approved by the delegates of the people who are affected by Texaco's petroleum
operations, meeting on April 27, 2001" in Lago Agrio. It does not disclose who authored the
rules; how many delegates were present for the vote; or how many people, or precisely who, in
representation of whom, voted to approve them. This reflects a general practice, in which
resolutions published by Frente carry the name of the "assembly" and purport to rest on the
authority of all affected people(s), but do not clearly identify the decision-makers. Not
surprisingly, the first major decision by the "assembly" - after granting itself decision-making
powers - was to ratify a vague summary of a settlement proposal that was apparently prepared
by the Aguinda plaintiffs' lawyers and presented to the group as "hecho (already done)." For
a fuller discussion, see Kimerling, Oil Frontier in Amazonia, supra note 6, at 652-64 (Part
XIII). See also infra note 79.
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case but are nonetheless learning about their rights and want to participate in
decision-making about their claims and remedies.
In July 2003, a second lawsuit, against ChevronTexaco and Texaco
Petroleum, was filed in the Superior Court of Justice of Tena by ninety
plaintiffs selected by thirty-one Kichwa and Huaorani communities.69 The
decision by the indigenous communities to file their own lawsuit reflects the
growing consciousness in the oil patch that indigenous peoples have legal
rights, and that Texaco and other companies have duties to them and should
answer to a higher authority - surprisingly radical ideas there, which have
been fostered by both Aguinda and developments in international and
Ecuadorian law that recognize rights of indigenous peoples.
The decision also reflects widespread discontent at the grassroots level with
the conduct of the Aguinda litigation and activities outside court by the
plaintiffs' lawyers and their NGO supporters that claim to champion the rights
of affected communities but exclude them from decision-making processes.
Two major concerns relate to remedies that might result from the litigation
and a possible (renewed) effort to settle the affected communities' claims
behind their backs.7" In addition, for indigenous peoples, the appropriation of
69. Plaintiffs' Complaint to the President of the Superior Court of Justice of Tena, Moi
Vicente Enomenga Mantohue v. ChevronTexaco Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. (July 30,2003)
[hereinafter Tena Complaint].
70. This is not an abstract concern. Since the mid-1990s, there have been seven
negotiations behind closed doors, purportedly to remedy the injuries caused by Texaco, between
the company and elites who professed to represent the interests of affected residents but rebuffed
their calls for transparency and participation. Six negotiations resulted in "remedial"
agreements with public officials; the seventh, with the Aguinda plaintiffs lawyers, reportedly
ended after Aguinda was dismissed by the district court. The six agreements include the
Remediation Contract with Ecuador and Petroecuador, discussed above; four agreements with
municipal governments (in the oil boom towns of Lago Agrio, Francisco de Orellana (Coca),
Joya de las Sachas, and Shushufindi); and an accord with the Prefect of Sucumbios Province.
From the perspective of local residents, none of the agreements remedied injuries that were
caused by Texaco or benefited affected rural communities. Not surprisingly, then, when news
of secret negotiations between Texaco and the Aguinda plaintiffs lawyers reached the oil patch,
many people were uneasy and catalyzed to action. Remarkably, in response to requests from
affected residents for information, the lawyers and Frente denied that the talks were underway.
Subsequently, the lawyers presented a $141 million written settlement proposal to Texaco in the
name of all affected groups; however, despite repeated requests from local residents whose
claims would presumably be settled (and relinquished) as part of the proposed agreement, the
lawyers and Frente refused to disclose the proposal. Instead, they distributed a vague summary
in the oil patch. Although Texaco rejected the settlement proposal afterAguinda was dismissed,
many people remain concerned that negotiations could resume as a result of the Lago Agrio
lawsuit, and that Frente and its lawyers might try to settle their claims without their consent.
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their name without authorization is deeply offensive - an offense that is
compounded by their belief that the lawyers and NGOs are using their name
and suffering for private gain. A related grievance, and longstanding
complaint of indigenous peoples throughout Amazonia, is their exclusion from
decision-making by outsiders - governments, companies, environmental
NGOs, and others - that affects them. In this case, decisions about the
conduct of the lawsuit in Lago Agrio could affect not only the territories and
natural resources of the Huaorani and Kichwa but also their legal rights.
The plaintiffs in the Tena case came together in the wake of the dismissal
of Aguinda v. Texaco. The indigenous federation FCUNAE (Federation of
Comunas Union of Natives of the Ecuadorian Amazon), comprised of Kichwa
communities in the Napo River basin, including Napo Kichwa who are
affected by Texaco, organized a series of meetings with groups of
communities at locations along the river, to inform them about the latest
developments and consider their alternatives. At the request of federation
officials, the author participated in the meetings. Three alternatives were
suggested for consideration: (1) negotiate with the Aguinda plaintiffs'
attorneys and Frente to participate in the Lago Agrio lawsuit; (2) present a
separate, community-based lawsuit; or (3) take no action. Participants
expressed considerable interest in pursuing their own lawsuit and strongly
opposed working with Frente and its lawyers.
A follow-up meeting, called "Reunion de Compromiso con la Demanda
(Meeting for Commitment with the Lawsuit)," was scheduled in Francisco de
Orellana (Coca), where FCUNAE's headquarters and the only notary in
Orellana Province are located. The Huaorani learned about the meeting when
the traditional chief of a community in Cononaco basin saw the author in Coca
and asked her to "help the Huaorani like you are helping the Kichwa." The
Huaorani, he explained, "are dying from the oil companies and have nowhere
to go."
On July 14,2003, the prospective plaintiffs, sent by their communities from
as far as 300 kilometers away, assembled in Coca for the Reunion de
Compromiso. The Kichwa agreed to work with their Huaorani neighbors in
the new lawsuit, launching an unprecedented grassroots alliance that they call
"Makarik Nihua." Makarik is Kichwa for luchadores (fighters); Nihua was
a great Huaorani warrior. A request from a group of local colonists, however,
who also came to the meeting and asked to join the legal action, was rejected.
The indigenous plaintiffs affirmed their desire to work with colonists to
For a fuller discussion of these and related concerns, see Kimerling, Oil Frontier in Amazonia,
supra note 6, at 652-64 (Part XIII).
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defend the rights of all affected groups and secure remedies for shared
environmental problems, but wanted their lawsuit to also assert their special
collective rights and grievances as indigenous Amazonian peoples. Some
people were also concerned that if colonists were among the plaintiffs, another
Frente-type group might emerge to try to claim ownership of the lawsuit and
relegate the indigenous communities to the margins, in favor of a small group
of colonists and corrupt indigenous political elites. Having become cognizant
of their rights and catalyzed to action - in significant measure, as a result of
Aguinda - they were now determined to speak for themselves as indigenous
peoples and communities and to become subjects rather than objects of their
rights. They further agreed to seek the collaboration of FCUNAE and the
Huaorani organization, ONHAE (Organization of the Huaorani Nationality of
the Ecuadorian Amazon), in support of their base communities, but resolved
to be accountable to the communities and to not relinquish the
decision-making power of the communities to officials of the federations.
The group also agreed that the legal action should be part of a broader
lucha (fight) by the communities to assert their rights, including efforts to
build alliances with other affected groups and outsiders who share their
concerns. They pledged to respect the right of other affected communities to
choose their own representatives, and affirmed that conduct of the litigation
and other activities must be clear and transparent, to prevent corruption and
ensure "trust in the process" by community members. Finally, they resolved
to seek social as well as environmental remedies for injuries that were created
by Texaco - and continued by Petroecuador.7"
The court in Tena, however, refused to accept the Kichwa and Huaorani
plaintiffs' complaint and open a case. Under applicable Ecuadorian
procedures, plaintiffs seeking to pursue a lawsuit present their complaint to
the court but do not serve the defendant. The judge reviews the complaint and
if the elements of the action are present, the court formally initiates the lawsuit
and summons the defendant. In the Tena case, the president of the court
refused to process the complaint for arbitrary reasons: (1) because the
complaint had not been translated into English and defendant ChevronTexaco
resides in the United States; and (2) for jurisdictional reasons because the
affected lands owned by the plaintiffs' communities include lands beyond the
geographic boundaries of the provinces where the court is located.72 The
71. The plaintiffs also asked the author to accompany them in the legal process and
authorized her to represent them and their communities outside Ecuador's courts.
72. H. Superior Court of Justice of Tena, Presidency, For Plaintiff Dr. Ernesto Lopez Freire
(Aug. 26, 2003); H. Superior Court of Justice of Tena, Presidency, For Plaintiff Dr. Ernesto
[Vol. 3 1
No. 2] TRANSNA TIONAL OPERATIONS, BI-NA TIONAL INJUSTICE 481
plaintiffs appealed to the plenary of the court - two judges who were
described by a local lawyer as "students" of the president of the court. They
upheld the dismissal.73
The Ecuadorian lawyer who represented the plaintiffs, Dr. Ernesto Lopez,
a former president of Ecuador's constitutional court, attributes the dismissal
to an "act of corruption. 74 The dismissal followed at least three ex parte
visits to the Tena court by legal representatives of Texaco. The visits began
just a few days after the complaint was filed, while the court was officially
closed for a fifteen-day "judicial vacation,"" and despite the facts that the
defendants had not been served with the complaint and the case was not
publicized. The plaintiffs do not know who informed Texaco about the action,
including the name ofplaintiffs' Ecuadorian counsel, but suspect that the Tena
court informed the defendants informally, without the knowledge of plaintiffs'
counsel and without following formal legal procedures.
The plaintiffs appealed to Ecuador's Supreme Court, where the case
languished for more than a year. In December 2004, it was further stalled by
a national political and constitutional crisis that has shaken the judiciary and
left Ecuador without a lawful Supreme Court for nearly a year." In 2006, a
Lopez Freire (Sept. 2, 2003). The Tena court is located in the capital of Napo Province;
however, because Orellana Province, where most of the plaintiffs reside, does not have a
superior court, the Superior Court of Tena has appellate and some original jurisdiction in both
Napo and Orellana. Under Ecuador's Law ofEnvironmental Management, when environmental
damage occurs in more than one province, the president of the superior court with jurisdiction
in any location where damage occurs is competent to adjudicate the case. Ley de Gesti6n
Ambiental [Law of Environmental Management], arts. 41-43, R.O. No. 245 (July 30, 1999)
(Ecuador) [hereinafter Law of Environmental Management]. Huaorani lands are located in
Orellana, Napo, and Pastaza provinces; affected Napo Kichwa lands are located in Orellana and
Sucumbios. The other affected indigenous groups (Cofan, Siona, and Secoya) live further north,
in Sucumbios province. The Tena court is the same court that had appellate jurisdiction in the
lawsuit against Petroecuador, discussed supra, in which a verdict in favor of the plaintiff was
overturned on appeal by the Supreme Court, which also penalized the judges who had allowed
the unprecedented environmental action to proceed.
73. H. Superior Court of Justice of Tena, Civil Lawsuit No. 714-2003 (Oct. 29,2003) (on
file with author).
74. Unsworn Declaration of Dr. Ernesto Lopez Freire Subject to Penalty of Perjury (Aug.
28, 2006) [hereinafter Lopez Declaration] (on file with author).
75. All courts are closed from August 1-15.
76. A special session of Congress summoned by President Lucio Gutierrez voted to remove
the Supreme Court judges and name a new court. Constitutional reforms enacted in 1998,
aimed at depoliticizing the judiciary, provide life terms for Supreme Court judges and further
provide that when vacancies arise, new judges should be appointed by the court. See ECUADOR
CONST. OF 1998, art. 202. The fired judges tried to defy the congressional action but were
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new Supreme Court sent the case back to Tena with a finding that the local
court had acted "irresponsibly" and unlawfully - "gravely disobeying its
duty" - when it refused to initiate the lawsuit." Plaintiffs' Ecuadorian
counsel, however, advised MakarikNihua that it would be futile and foolhardy
to attempt to begin the case again, in the same court against the same
defendant, because of the likelihood of further acts of corruption. In addition,
the delay caused by the early machinations may have jeopardized the
plaintiffs' ability to pursue at least some of their claims before even a
theoretically honest court because under Ecuadorian law, limitation periods
generally are not tolled until after service of process by the court, an act that
was denied to the Tena plaintiffs. Finally, the experience of the plaintiffs in
the lawsuit in Lago Agrio, which began with great expectations and fanfare
but is now seen by many attorneys as bogged down in civil law procedures
that are prohibitively costly, cumbersome, and slow, and thus not suitable for
barred by police from returning to their offices. The crisis reflected and reinforced both the
weakness of the judicial branch and the turbulent nature of politics in Ecuador. Gutierrez was
"angry that the court [had] sided with opposition politicians in a failed attempt to impeach him"
on corruption charges and "contended that the measure was aimed at restoring independence
to the court" because the judges were closely aligned with a powerful political party. Juan
Forero, Firings on Ecuador's Top Court Stir Opposition Wrath, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,2004, at
A3.
The firings followed mass firings of judges on the Constitutional and Supreme Electoral
courts and their replacement by political allies of the President, and "plunged . . . [the]
chronically unstable" country "into uncertainty." Id. Critics accused Gutierrez of trying to
consolidate power but initially, the firings did not generate popular outrage because many
Ecuadorians see the courts as politicized and corrupt, and regarded the conflict as a fight
between political elites. However, after the new Supreme Court invalidated corruption charges
against a former President, Abdala Bucaram, and he returned to Ecuador from exile,
demonstrations in the capital surged. In response, the President and Congress dissolved the new
Supreme Court, and resolved to create a new legal mechanism to choose a new court. The move
failed to subdue the protesters, who were fed up with corrupt, inept governments and economic
hardship. Demonstrators accused Gutierrez of corruption and dictatorship and called for
removal of the President - and all politicians in the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches - chanting, "Que se vayan todos (Out with all of them)" and "No mas de lo mismo
(No more of the same)." On April 20, 2004, a special session of Congress voted to remove
Gutierrez on the dubious constitutional ground of "abandonment" of his post. The military
withdrew its support from Gutierrez, and he became the third elected president since 1997 to
be ousted from power. Vice President Alfredo Palacio became Ecuador's seventh President in
eight years. Because of "bitter divisions" in the Congress, however, a new Supreme Court was
not installed until November 30, 2005. Juan Forero, Ecuador: A New Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 30, 2005, at A14.
77. Supreme Court of Justice, First Civil and Commercial Chamber, Dr. Ernesto Lopez,
attorney for Moi Enomenga Mantohue and others (Jan. 31, 2006) (on file with author).
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mass toxic tort litigation, further convinced plaintiffs' counsel that it would
be naive and misleading for him to attempt to pursue the Tena case, and that
without at least one million dollars (which the plaintiffs do not have), it would
be impossible for them to retain lawyers in Ecuador to assume that task in a
responsible and professional way.7"
VI. Outside Court and Other Courts
For Makarik Nihua, the refusal by the Tena court to hear their case was like
a slap in the face. Many people expressed "hurt" and "sadness" that their own
judicial "authorities" refused to "listen" to their grievances and "atender
(attend to)" their petition for justice. Although belief in their basic rights
remains strong, the decision by the Tena court cast renewed doubt on the
value of those rights in Ecuador's legal and judicial system, misgivings that
have been compounded by developments in Lago Agrio. There, the
authorities of another province are "hearing" a case by a relatively small group
of plaintiffs that includes claims based on injuries to the Kichwa and Huaorani
communities, without their consent, and which asks for payments to Frente to
remedy their grievances. From the communities' perspective, Texaco and
Ecuador ran roughshod over their rights for decades; then, their claims against
the company attracted outsiders who profess to champion their rights but
refuse to listen when indigenous communities want to speak for themselves
and even claim to represent them against their wishes, or, in the case of
external NGOs, help colonizers (Frente) "take their name" against their
wishes. Subsequently, when a substantial sector of the indigenous peoples of
Orellana Province stepped forward to speak in their own voice and become
protagonists in the celebrated fight to assert their rights and remedy their
injuries, their own judicial authorities also refused to listen, and turned them
away after meeting privately with lawyers for Texaco.
At the same time, activities outside court to publicize and garner support
for the lawsuit in Lago Agrio have aggravated feelings of marginalization and
exploitation among the Kichwa and Huaorani. The Aguinda lawyers, Frente,
and their new U.S. NGO partner, Amazon Watch, have mounted a major
public relations campaign that represents the new case as the continuation of
Aguinda v. Texaco, on behalf of all (30,000) affected residents. As part of that
78. See Lopez Declaration, supra note 74. Dr. Lopez further counseled the plaintiffs not
to count on the Supreme Court that had found in their favor to protect their rights in the future,
because it probably would not survive Ecuador's next change in government, scheduled for
2007; and that applicable legal procedures do not permit them to intervene as plaintiffs in the
lawsuit in Lago Agrio.
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effort they claim, falsely, that the Lago Agrio lawsuit was "brought by five
indigenous groups and eighty communities,"79 and cultivate the misleading
impression that Frente (or its "Assembly of Delegates")" represents all of the
79. Amazon Watch & Amazon Defense Front, Clean Up Ecuador Campaign: Background
on the Historic Trial, http://www.chevrontoxico.com/article.php?id=55 (last visited Feb. 8,
2007); see also Amazon Watch, Clean Up Ecuador Campaign: Campaign, http://www.chevron
toxico.com/article.php?id=l 11 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007) (contending that Amazon Watch has
"forged successful partnerships in Ecuador" with "the indigenous federations representing the
Cofan, Huaorani, Siona, Secoya, and Quichua [Kichwa] peoples," as well as with Frente,
Action Ecologica and the Center for Economic and Social Rights; also featuring a photograph
of Huaorani). In Ecuador, the environmental NGO Accion Ecologica is Frente's leading ally
in the campaign to support its lawsuit. That campaign makes similar claims about the Lago
Agrio case and also excludes Makarik Nihua.
80. As discussed supra, the "Assembly of Delegates" was organized by Frente in 2001
(with financial support from Oxfam America), and has limited participation and controlling
rules for decisionmaking. By "regulation," Frente is "the technical and administrative unit in
charge of [both] obtaining the information" needed by the "Assembly of Delegates" and its
executive committee, and "executing and coordinating the activities derived from" their
decisions. Regulations, supra note 68, arts. 7-11.
The rules for decision-making by the "assembly," summarized supra note 68, not only
contradict commonly-expressed local political aspirations that favor decisionmaking by
consensus and respect for decisions made at the community level, but also abrogate the rights
of dissidents to pursue their own claims. Although clearly at odds with basic principles of due
process and, therefore, legally dubious at best, the bald assertion of decision-making power by
Frente and its "Assembly of Delegates" could nonetheless affect the rights and interests of
affected groups and individuals because it is supported, and in the eyes of many, orchestrated
by, the Aguinda plaintiffs' lawyers. For indigenous communities, that assertion of power not
only raises troubling questions related to the adequacy of representation and basic due process
protections, but also threatens to eviscerate their rights as indigenous peoples by allowing
"obligatory" decisions about their rights and claims to be made entirely by outsiders. In
addition to denying representation (and decision-making power) to the largest indigenous group,
the Kichwa, the "Regulations" for the "assembly" grant the Huaorani, Cofan, Secoya, and Siona
the appearance of representation, but take away their right to make their own decisions and
authorize a small number of colonists to make decisions that purport to bind them.
Significantly, the delegates who were invited by Frente to represent the affected indigenous
peoples in the "assembly" do not have enough votes under any decision-making scenario
allowed by the "Regulations" - even if all four delegates are in agreement and they have proper
authorization from the communities and peoples they ostensibly represent - to either constitute
a majority to adopt a decision or to block a decision favored by a group of colonists with which
they disagree. Not surprisingly, the "Regulations,"and claims that Frente and the "Assembly
of Delegates" represent all affected groups, have been rejected by Makarik Nihua, FCUNAE,
and ONHAE. See, e.g., FCUNAE, XX Asamblea Ordinaria De FCUNAE, En La Comuna Patas
Yacu, Del Canton Orellana, Del 13 Al 15 De Junio De 2001, Plenario Y Resoluciones De Las
Comisiones [20th Ordinary Assembly of FCUNAE, in Comuna Patas Yacu, Canton Orellana,
June 13-15, 2001, Plenary and Resolutions of the Commissions] at 2.12-2.17 (June 15, 2001)
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indigenous peoples (and colonists) who are affected by Texaco. 8' They
(on file with author); Letter from FCUNAE to Luis Yanza, Amazon Defense Front (July 15,
2001) (on file with author); Makarik Nihua, Segunda Asamblea de Makarik Nihua realizado en
la ciudad de Francisco de Orellana, sede de FCUNAE; los dias 28 y 29 de junio de 2004
[Second Assembly of Makarik Nihua in Francisco de Orellana, FCUNAE headquarters; June
28 and 29, 2004] at 2 (on file with author); Carta de la Nacionalidad Huaorani al Gobiemo de
Alfredo Palacio, a la Nacion Ecuatoriana y al Mundo Por la Autodeterminaci6n de la
Nacionalidad Huaorani y Contra Petrobras en el Bloque 31 [Letter from the Huaorani Nation
to the Government of Alfredo Palacio, the Ecuadorian Nation and the World, For Huaorani
Self-Determination and Against Petrobras in Block 31], July 12, 2005, at no. 8 (on file with
author); Makarik Nihua, Resoluciones de la Cuarta Asamblea de Makarik Nihua en la Comuna
San Carlos 16 de enero de 2006 [Resolutions of the Fourth Assembly of Makarik Nihua in
Comuna San Carlos, Jan. 16,2006] [hereinafter Resolutions of the Fourth Assembly ofMakarik
Nihua]; Makarik Nihua, Denuncia de Makarik Nihua [Denunciation by Makarik Nihua]
(delivered July 10, 2006); Makarik Nihua, Mensaje de las Comunidades Kichwas y Huaoranis
de Makarik Nihua al Foro Internacional Petr6leo, Derechos Humanos y Reparaci6n Ambiental,
Fco. De Orellana (Coca), 20, 21, y 22 de Octubre de 2006 [Message From the Kichwa and
Huaorani Communities ofMakarik Nihua to the Internacional Forum Petroleum, Human Rights
and Environmental Reparation, Fco. de Orellana (Coca), October 20, 21 and 22, 2006]
[hereinafter Makarik Nihua Message].
81. See, e.g., Amazon Watch & Amazon Defense Front, Clean Up Ecuador Campaign: The
Affected Communities, http://www.chevrontoxico.com/article.php?id=56 (last visited Feb. 8,
2007); Amazon Defense Front, About Us, http://www.amazonwatch.org/about_us/ (last visited
Feb. 8, 2007); Press Release, Amazon Watch, "Our People Are Dying .... ": Ecuadorian
Indigenous Leaders Arrive in Bay Area to Urge ChevronTexaco to Clean Up Toxic Waste in
Amazon Region: Indigenous Leaders Will Provide Briefing on Their Historic Billion-Dollar
Class Action Suit Against the Petroleum Polluter That's Killing Their People (Dec. 9, 2002)
(publicizing a visit to the Bay Area by three "indigenous leaders" and identifying Frente's Luis
Yanza, a mestizo and urban colonist who is not a member of an affected community, as an
"indigenous leader" and "affected communities spokesperson;" also asserting that Yanza and
the two other "indigenous leaders," none of whom are plaintiffs, "filed" Aguinda on behalf of
30,000 Ecuadorians; referring to indigenous leaders, populations or tribes ten times but not
mentioning affected colonists; and stating that, "at last these indigenous leaders will have the
opportunity to speak on behalf of their culture and people and provide first-hand accounts of
how ChevronTexaco has decimated their land, their culture and their lives"); Koenig, supra note
65; Press Release, Amazon Watch, Amazon Watch Calls on ChevronTexaco to Address Cancer
Outbreak in Ecuador: New Health Study Finds Child Cancer Rising Rapidly in Area Where
ChevronTexaco Operated: 91 Child Cancer Cases Reported, Many Under Age of 5: Study
Released During $6 Billion Lawsuit (Sept. 30, 2004); Press Release, Amazon Watch, Pressure
Mounts on ChevronTexaco to Confront its Responsibility for the "Rainforest Chernobyl": $6
Billion in Potential Liability for World's Largest Oil Disaster: Rising Tide of Institutional
Investors Call on CEO David O'Reilly to Report on Environmental Impacts ofAn Eco-Disaster
Said to be Far Worse Than Exxon Valdez: Human Rights Campaigner Bianca Jagger Calls on
CEO to Remedy This Catastrophe: "Whilst Mr. O'Reilly is Stalling, People are Dying in the
Ecuadorian Amazon": After Years of Suffering, Indigenous Chief Will Finally Face Down
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estimate the cost of the environmental remediation sought by the legal action
at more than six billion dollars. However, the basis for that estimate is murky,
and despite representations to the public and the media that a "Remediation
Plan" was prepared for the court in 2003, there is no remediation plan or
process underway to inform and consult the affected communities and develop
a serious plan. Efforts by the Kichwa and Huaorani to get information about
remedial measures that underlie the estimate and engage Frente and its
lawyers in a dialogue about remedial alternatives have been rebuffed.8 2
O'Reilly in Person on Wednesday (Apr. 26, 2004); Press Release, Amazon Watch,
Environmental "Trial of Century" Pits 50,000 Ecuadorian Rainforest People Against
ChevronTexaco... : Bianca Jagger To Visit Amazon Jungle in Ecuador: Case of Rainforest
Peoples Against ChevronTexaco to Begin Oct. 21 in Lago Agrio, Sucumbios: First Time U.S.
Oil Company Forced to Face Judgment in Ecuador Court: Jagger to Meet with Indigenous
Leaders and Tour Communities Ravaged by Illegal Dumping on Oct. 9th-Oth (Oct. 8, 2003);
Amazon Watch, Media Advisory (Oct. 7, 2003); Press Release, Amazon Defense Front, Caution
Issued to Chevron Shareholders: New Ad Campaign Warns Chevron That It Must Pay Billions
For Texaco's Dumping In Amazon Rainforest: Texaco's Huge Liability Poses Major Obstacles
For SEC Approval Of Merger With Chevron: Texaco Again Charged With Race Discrimination
(Aug. 9, 2001). For similar contentions by the plaintiffs' lawyers while the U.S. case was
underway, see Kimerling, Oil Frontier in Amazonia, supra note 6, at 474-84 (Part V).
82. In October 2003, at a public forum organized byMakarikNihua, Frente's president was
asked about the group's plans for a cleanup in the event of a victory in court. His response, that
"the lawyers are the ones who can answer because they know what they are planning,"
suggested that Frente either did not have a remediation plan and/or proposal under development
or that it had one but was unwilling to disclose it. Two weeks later, Frente issued a press release
announcing "The week of Truth for ChevronTexaco," to publicize the first public proceedings
in the Lago Agrio case. Highlights included "Presentation of the Remediation Plan." Press
Release, Amazon Defense Front, La Semana de Verdad para ChevronTexaco; Testimonios
siguen, Plan de Remediaci6n se presenta ylos demandantes se movilizan; Bianca Jagger, la lider
de los derechos humanos internacionales regresa al Ecuador para apoyar a los demandantes [The
Week of Truth for ChevronTexaco; Testimonies Continue; Remediation Plan Is Presented and
the Plaintiffs Mobilize Themselves; Bianca Jagger, the International Human Rights Leader
Returns to Ecuador to Support the Plaintiffs] (Oct. 27, 2003) (on file with author). The author
received a copy of the release from another NGO and contacted Leila Salazar of Amazon Watch,
who was named as a press contact, to request a copy of the plan. Salazar responded by sending
what she called "the summary of the preliminary remediation plan" (in English and Spanish).
E-mail from Leila Salazar to Judith Kimerling (Jan. 13, 2004); Global Environmental
Operations, Inc., Remediation in Former Texaco Concessions in Ecuador: A Preliminary
Assessment (undated). The "summary" estimated cleanup costs at $6.114 billion and was
evidently submitted to the court in support of the plaintiffs' request for remedial funds. The
entire document, however, was less than four pages and failed to disclose important information
and details about the "Remediation Plan," including the locations that were slated for cleanup.
The author then requested a copy of the complete plan and information about mechanisms to
inform and consult with affected communities. E-mail from Judith Kimerling to Leila Salazar
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This effort to claim a monopoly of representation and paint a grassroots,
indigenous veneer on the Lago Agrio lawsuit and activities by Frente and its
NGO allies has continued despite (1) repeated protests and exhortations by
FCUNAE, Makarik Nihua, and growing numbers of Huaorani (including
officials of ONHAE) to stop using the name of all affected groups and to
respect community decisions to choose their own representatives and assert
their rights to participate in decisionmaking about their claims and remedies;
(2) the refusal by FCUNAE's president, despite considerable pressure, to
endorse the case or sign a "contract" with the plaintiffs' attorneys to continue
the Aguinda litigation in Ecuador;83 (3) the decision by a substantially larger
group of Kichwa and Huaorani claimants to pursue a separate, indigenous
lawsuit and organize their own community-based alliance; (4) the fact that
Frente is a colonist organization with limited legitimacy in the oil patch,
especially among grassroots indigenous populations; and (5) the decision by
the lawyers to ask the Lago Agrio court to award the relief to Frente, to not
request compensation for affected residents, and to limit the plaintiffs to forty-
eight individuals who do not include legitimate representatives of most
affected groups.
Those activities have succeeded in maintaining a spotlight on the Lago
Agrio lawsuit and grievances of the affected communities, especially affected
indigenous peoples,84 and in building new political alliances to pressure
(Jan. 29, 2004) (also updating Amazon Watch on the Tena case and requesting a meeting to
discuss concerns related to the NGO's "Clean Up Ecuador" campaign, including dissemination
of inaccurate information). In response, Salazar retreated from the language in the press release
and claimed that there is no Remediation Plan: "the summary is the only thing there is." E-mail
from Leila Salazar to Judith Kimerling (Feb. 20, 2004). Supporters of Aguinda have long
promoted the lawsuit in the oil patch as the "last chance" for a cleanup. Although the absence
of a comprehensive, ready-to-execute six billion dollar plan at this stage is understandable, the
failure of the lawyers and their NGO supporters to foster a transparent and participatory process
to develop a remedial plan, while promising a "cleanup," is disquieting. In a subsequent
communication, Salazar explained that Amazon Watch continues to use the "preliminary
analysis ... to put out a figure [for cleanup costs] that will scare Chevron and investors."
E-mail from Leila Salazar to Judith Kimerling (Jan. 16, 2007).
83. See Contrato Para Litigar El Caso En Contra De Texaco En El Ecuador [Contract to
Litigate the Case Against Texaco in Ecuador] (undated) (unsigned sample contract provided by
Frente to FCUNAE) (on file with author).
84. As discussed supra, the Aguinda v. Texaco plaintiffs' attorneys commonly attributed
their allegations to "Indians" and "tribal leaders" without mentioning affected colonists.
Amazon Watch materials occasionally refer to both indigenous peoples and campesinos (small
farmers) but usually do not, and the NGO commonly uses the term "rainforest peoples" to refer
to the claimants and affected communities, in an apparent attempt to put an indigenous face on
the Lago Agrio lawsuit and its activities to support the case. The NGO also features
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ChevronTexaco outside court to clean up Texaco's mess. However, the
Kichwa and Huaorani communities of Makarik Nihua have been excluded
from the alliances that profess to support the affected communities, and
remain in the shadows of the spotlight.8 5 In addition, the portrait - in the
spotlight - of the grievances and lucha of the affected groups has been
colored by the views and private interests of their self-appointed champions
and has offended a significant sector of the indigenous peoples whose rights
and interests are purportedly being defended.86 As a general matter, activities
by the NGOs have continued the dynamic that emerged during Aguinda v.
Texaco of claiming to support the affected communities but essentially leaving
the conduct of the litigation, including development of a remediation plan, to
the lawyers, as if a victory in court or a settlement with plaintiffs' counsel
would automatically benefit all affected people(s) and the rainforest
environment.8 7
photographs of Huaorani on its website and the (linked) site that it shares with Frente to
promote their campaign. Remarkably, Amazon Watch promotes itself as a group that is
dedicated to defending the rights of indigenous peoples, in addition to the environment. See
generally Amazon Watch, http://www.amazonwatch.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2007); Amazon
Watch & Amazon Defense Front, Clean Up Ecuador Campaign, http://www.chevrontoxico.org
(last visited Feb. 8, 2007); AMAZON WATCH, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2003) [hereinafter 2002
ANNUAL REPORT] (repeatedly referring to work with indigenous peoples without mentioning
work with colonists, and contending that "the indigenous peoples of the Amazon have come to
trust and count on Amazon Watch's support"); AMAZON WATCH, 2003 ANNUALREPORT 3, 7-12
(2004) [hereinafter 2003 ANNUAL REPORT] (characterizing campaigns by the NGO, including
work to support Aguinda, as "triumphs for forest peoples").
85. See, e.g., Shelley Alpern, Trillium Asset Management Joins Investor Delegation in
Ecuadorian Amazon to Investigate Claims that ChevronTexaco Polluted Ecosystem, INVESTING
FOR A BETrER WORLD (Trillium Asset Mgmt., Boston, Mass.), Apr. 2004 (reporting on a
"fact-finding trip" to Ecuador organized by Amazon Watch for ChevronTexaco shareholders
and stating, inaccurately, that the company "is being sued in a class-action case [in Lago Agrio]
representing 30,000 indigenous inhabitants" of the rainforest region). The shareholders visited
Coca but were not told about the Tena case or Makarik Nihua, and Trillium subsequently
sponsored a shareholder resolution calling on the company to "report on new initiatives.., to
address the specific.., concerns of villagers living near ... sources ofcontamination in the area
where Texaco worked in Ecuador." ChevronTexaco Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A),
at 51 (Mar. 26, 2004).
86. The Napo Kichwa and Huaorani are by far the largest indigenous groups affected by
Texaco, in terms of both population and territory.
87. See, e.g., E-mail from Leila Salazar to Friends of Amazon Watch (Oct. 21,2003) (on file
with author); E-mail from The Amazon Watch Team to Friends of Amazon Watch (Oct. 21, 2003)
(on file with author). At the same time, activities by plaintiffs' counsel and their NGO supporters
continue to reflect limited knowledge of the affected indigenous peoples' cultures, communities,
and natural world and threaten to obscure the complexities of social and environmental issues in
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In April 2006, Cristobal Bonifaz, who was co-counsel for the plaintiffs in
Aguinda v. Texaco and for Frente and the Lago Agrio plaintiffs until March
2006, filed a new class action lawsuit against Chevron, Doe v. Texaco, in
federal court in San Francisco, with nine named plaintiffs, all colonists, who
suffer from cancer or an increased risk of cancer that they attribute to
pollution from Texaco's produced water wastes in Ecuador.8 The complaint
was based on claims of unjust enrichment and violation of California's Unfair
Competition Law, and asked for disgorgement of the unlawful profits to build
medical facilities in the impacted region where the plaintiffs live. 9 The court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be
granted but allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. The amended
complaint also arises out of injuries related to cancer and increased risk of
cancer, but is not a class action and is based on common law claims of
negligence, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and battery.
It seeks equitable relief in the form of a medical monitoring trust fund to
the oil patch, including challenges related to (1) representation of diverse, multi-ethnic populations
in a large area; and (2) the need to develop consensus about priorities for remedial measures. The
risks presented by inattention to those complex realities - and related legal and ethical
challenges - have increased since the dismissal of Aguinda v. Texaco in favor of litigation in
Ecuador because, although basic principles of due process are recognized under Ecuadorian law,
unlike U.S. class action law, clear procedures and precedents to protect absent parties who could
be affected by group litigation are not well developed.
Amazon Watch began its "Clean Up Ecuador" campaign in 2002 and initially pledged to
support all affected groups and to respect grassroots decisions and concerns, including
longstanding concerns related to representation. However, theAguinda attorneys subsequently
obtained the services of a public relations firm to work with the NGO. Although Amazon
Watch continues to describe its campaign as an initiative to support the demands of the affected
communities, and now also claims (falsely) to work in partnership with all of the indigenous
federations that represent the affected indigenous peoples (including the Huaorani and Kichwa),
since the Lago Agrio lawsuit began, it has made support for that case the centerpiece of its
campaign and appears to have become a megaphone for the plaintiffs' lawyers. See generally
Amazon Watch, http://www.amazonwatch.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2007); Clean Up Ecuador
Campaign, http://www.chevrontoxico.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2007). In addition to in-kind
support to publicize the NGO's activities, Amazon Watch has evidently received funds from
Kohn, Swift and Graf, co-counsel for the Aguinda plaintiffs. 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
84, at 10; 2002 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 84, at 15.
88. Complaint, Jane Doe v. Texaco, Inc., Civ. No. 06CV02820 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24,2006),
2006 WL 2805512.
89. See id. In 2005, ChevronTexaco changed its name to Chevron. The complaint also
names Texaco, Inc. and Texaco Petroleum Company as defendants; those companies have been
wholly owned subsidiaries of ChevronTexaco (now Chevron) since the 2001 merger between
Texaco, Inc., and Chevron Corp., but appear to be paper corporations that have not carried out
any operations since the merger.
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establish medical facilities in the affected region, or compensatory and
punitive damages.90 The defendants moved to dismiss the case, alleging that
it is time barred under California and Ecuador law. The court denied the
motion and ruled that the jury must determine, as to each plaintiff, whether the
onset of cancer occurred before April 25, 2002, four years before the lawsuit
was filed. If the cancer developed after that date, the plaintiff's claim would
not be barred.9' Interestingly, ChevronTexaco has not moved to dismiss that
case on the ground offorum non conveniens. Trial is scheduled for January
2008.
The Doe plaintiffs sought to protect their identities from Frente and proceed
with their lawsuit using pseudonyms. In a sworn declaration to the court,
Bonifaz recounted some of the history of Aguinda and the Lago Agrio lawsuit
to explain why the Doe plaintiffs "have a genuine concern that they would
face harassment and retaliation, including physical retaliation, if their names
and/or other identifying information were to be publicly disclosed."92
Although the motion to proceed anonymously was denied, the allegations by
Frente's former counsel are troubling for Makarik Nihua and raise additional
concerns about the litigation in Lago Agrio:
The Frente has repeatedly claimed to the Ecuadorian public and
media that the Lago Agrio litigation will result in a six billion
dollarjudgment against Chevron. In Ecuador, the prevailing public
expectation is that the Frente will soon control billions of dollars.
As a result, the organization has become a powerful political
force ....
... The Frente is likely to see this action [Doe v. Texaco] as a
threat to the money and political power that it has gained and/or
hopes to gain from the Lago Agrio litigation. I believe that if the
90. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss and Denying Motion to Stay, Jane Doe v. Texaco,
Inc., No. C 06-02820 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2006), 2006 WL 2053504; Plaintiffs First Amended
Complaint, Jane Doe v. Texaco, Inc., No. C 06-02820 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2006), 2006 WL
2805517. The complaint also seeks costs of the suit, including attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs Jane
Doe I and II have breast cancer; Jane Doe III has uterine cancer; Jane Doe IV has lymphoma
and thyroid cancer; Jane Doe V's minor son has leukemia; and Plaintiffs John Doe I-IV are
married to Jane Doe I-IV, respectively. Id.
91. Order Deferring in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Dismiss and Setting Hearing,
Jane Doe v. Texaco, Inc., No. C 06-02820 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2006); Order Denying Motion
to Dismiss, Jane Doe v. Texaco, Inc., No. C 06-02820 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006), 2006 WL
2917581.
92. Declaration of Crist6bal Bonifaz, supra note 66, T 4.
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identities and addresses of Plaintiffs in this action are disclosed,
the Frente will attempt to intimidate and harass Plaintiffs.93
Notwithstanding those political developments, the lack of external support
for Makarik Nihua, and their legal setback in Tena, the Kichwa and Huaorani
alliance has grown stronger internally, with most of the communities
reaffirming their resolve to work together to assert and protect their rights.
They have organized assemblies, marches, and delegations, and studied,
distributed - and even generated - written documents.94
93. Id. 12, 13; see also Supplemental Declaration of Crist6bal Bonifaz in Support of
Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Proceed With Action Using
Pseudonyms 7, Jane Doe v. Texaco, Inc., No. C-06 2820 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2006)
(explaining counsel's discharge by Frente and declaring, "If Plaintiffs' names were made
known, I have no doubt that the Frente would seek to relentlessly intimidate and harass the
Plaintiffs as a means of retaliation for their continuing relationship with this counsel."). The
case is currently proceeding sub nom. Luisa Gonzalez v. Texaco, Inc. The judge in the case is
William Alsup.
94. Both Huaorani and Kichwa cultures are oral, but they have learned the power of the
written word when dealing with outsiders. For example, in an assembly in January 2006, the
communities resolved to put their grievances against Frente and Amazon Watch into writing and
to publicize the denunciation. For years, the NGOs had disregarded their complaints and
concerns, and treated them and their lucha as if they were invisible. A document, they reasoned,
would strengthen their fight to have their voices heard and help them put an end to
misrepresentations by those groups. Resolutions of the Fourth Assembly of Makarik Nihua,
supra note 80. The denunciation pursuant to the resolutions (1) denounces Frente for "taking
the name of all of the people who are affected by Texaco and claiming to sue for our rights
without authorization;" (2) rejects the Assembly of Delegates organized by Frente; (3)
denounces Amazon Watch for "helping" Frente "take the name of all of the people who are
affected by Texaco, for spreading falsehoods about the lucha of the communities, and for
securing and managing [financial] resources in the name of the lucha of the indigenous peoples
against ChevronTexaco"; and (4) insists to Frente that it "respect the decisions of the Lower
Napo Kichwa communities and Huaorani People," that it "stop taking the name of all of the
people who are affected by Texaco," that it inform them and the author about what it will do if
it wins its lawsuit in Lago Agrio because "this can affect our environment and well-being," that
it "not go about misleading people and speaking falsehoods," and that it "no molesta (not bother
us) or enter our territories without written permission." Makarik Nihua Denunciation, supra
note 80.
A second document was prepared for an international public forum held in Coca in October
2006, the First International Forum on Petroleum, Human Rights and Environmental
Reparation. The forum was convened by Frente, Accion Ecologica and sixteen other
organizations, to "open a space" for people(s) affected by petroleum activities to come together
to develop strategies to defend their human, environmental, and collective (indigenous) rights.
Another objective, and reason for meeting in Coca, was to strengthen the lucha by the local
communities who are suing ChevronTexaco. Promotional materials published on the web
anticipated some 400 participants from thirty-six countries, including delegations from a number
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of local colonist and church-affiliated groups (also named as convening organizations), and
NGOs based in Quito. Makarik Nihua, however, was not invited. When they learned about the
forum (from a U.S.-based Native American NGO), Makarik Nihua asked one of the sponsors,
Ecumenical Commission for Human Rights (CEDHU), to arrange a meeting with the key
organizers of the event, to explain why they felt that Makarik Nihua should be invited and to
ask to address the forum. At the meeting, only CEDHU supported their request to allow a
Kichwa and a Huaorani representative to speak for five minutes each. The other NGOS -
Accion Ecologica, Oilwatch, Frente, SERPAJ, INREDH, and Orellana Human Rights
Committee - argued that if they allowed the Kichwa and Huaorani to speak, even for two
minutes, "then everyone would want to speak." No one inquired about what the Huaorani and
Kichwa might want to say, but they insisted that their organizations all work to defend the rights
of indigenous peoples. In response, Makarik Nihua decided to prepare a written message to the
forum and to organize a protest, if needed, to demand to be heard. They knew that unless they
spoke for themselves, Frente would speak to the forum in their name. They organized a group
of thirty-six Huaorani and Kichwa from eleven of the communities nearest to Coca to come to
the forum, and enlisted the support of FCUNAE and ONHAE. Faced with the prospect of an
embarrassing protest by representatives of the local indigenous peoples, the organizers finally
agreed to allow a Kichwa and a Huaorani representative to speak.
The written message explains that the Kichwa and Huaorani were the first peoples to be
affected by petroleum activities in the area, now known as Orellana Province; that everything
changed for them after Texaco arrived; and that Makarik Nihua is comprised of twenty-eight
communities who have united to defend their human, environmental, and collective rights. It
continues:
We are thankful that there is a lot of national and international concern for the
communities who are affected by Texaco and that many people have come to our
Amazonia [to the forum] to know and help the peoples who are affected by
petroleum activities. But we are hurt that they did not invite us, the ancestral
peoples of this area, who have our own process to fight to defend our rights and
solve the problems brought to our Amazonia by Texaco and other oil companies.
We had to fight to speak at this forum, to bring our message with our voice. We
asked to speak for ten minutes, but the convening organizations denied our
request. We do not understand why they come to our home to defend the rights
of the [indigenous] peoples but do not want to get to know our organization,
Makarik Nihua, or listen to our voice. We are sad that many organizations that
claim to defend our rights do not take us into account. It is as if they want to do
business with our suffering. They speak in the name of the affected indigenous
communities but do not want to listen when we want our voice to be heard.
Makarik Nihua Message, supra note 80. The message continues by explaining that Makarik
Nihua had been working, as communities affected by Texaco, for three years, initially in an
unsuccessful effort to sue ChevronTexaco in Tena, and most recently with a petition to intervene
in litigation between Ecuador and Petroecuador and ChevronTexaco in New York (discussed
infra). It states that the communities are aware of the lawsuit in Lago Agrio but explains why
they do not feel represented or respected by Frente and its lawyers, why they reject the
Assembly of Delegates organized by Frente, and why they "feel used by Frente and its NGO
friends." The message concludes by affirming that the communities want to fight for an
environmental remediation, as well as for social and cultural remedies, "but we want to
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Participation by Huaorani communities has grown considerably, especially in
the Cononaco and Napo river basins, as word of the new alliance has spread.
Both the commitment to work at the community level and the inclusion of
Huaorani plaintiffs and speakers have been significant factors in motivating
the Huaorani. Other motivating factors include repeated oil spills from
Texaco's aging facilities, and gatherings in which groups of Huaorani come
together to unite over shared concerns and elders recall their histories with the
missionaries and the company.95
participate in decisionmaking that affects us and to direct our lucha." It invites "good-willed
people to unite" with their lucha, approach them to become informed, and help the Kichwa and
Huaorani communities ofMakarikNihua: "We are working directly, without intermediaries, and
we want alliances with respect. Thank you for listening to our message." Id.
95. Like many indigenous groups, the Huaorani have long resisted, and resented, efforts by
outsiders to speak in their name. They have also struggled against efforts pioneered by oil
companies and apparently adopted, at least in part, by Frente, to try to "comprar (buy)" ONHAE
officials and use the organization to create the appearance of support among the Huaorani (or"authority") for their activities. The Huaorani of Makarik Nihua are angry at Frente and its
leader, Luis Yanza, because, in their words, "Yanza speaks for all but works with few,""promises to share a lot of money with ONHAE officials in order to change their thinking," and
is "mentiroso (a liar)." Like the Kichwa, they are offended by the complaint in Lago Agrio
because it includes claims based on injuries to them, but they were not consulted, there are no
Huaorani plaintiffs, and in the event of a victory, the monies for their remedies would be paid
to Frente; in addition, both groups say that Frente and its lawyers do not know their
communities or their "reality," so "how can they solve our problems?" The Huaorani also
complain that Yanza "invites Huaorani to many lunches" and on trips to Lago Agrio and the
United States but does not "trabaja bien (work in a good way)" or consult with affected
communities; claims to represent the Huaorani against their wishes; uses images of the Huaorani
without permission; and seeks to profit from their grievances. For a letter to Yanza protesting
how a visit to the United States was handled and exhorting Frente and Amazon Watch to
remove the name and photographs of Huaorani from their websites, see Letter from Manuela
Omari Ima, President, Association of Waorani Women of the Ecuadorian Amazon (AMWAE)
to Luis Yanza, Amazon Defense Front (Jan. 22, 2007) (on file with author) (also protesting
because Frente and Amazon Watch are using the name of the Waorani without permission and"without helping us," and adding, "Nor do [your organizations] know the Waorani communities
or territory. But your [website] propaganda lies, it wants to trick people with good intentions
who do want to help the Waorani;" further stating, with regard to the trip (which took place in
2004), that she accompanied Yanza to the United States because he offered to give her a
computer for ONHAE, but never but did, causing her family and co-workers to complain that
she went simply because she felt like it; that she did not understand the events well because she
does not speak English, but that Yanza and Amazon Watch pressured her to present herself in
Huaorani dress and chant in her language, and she could see that they asked for funds (at an
event in New York); asking how much money they had raised and what happened to it; and
stating that she felt used by them but that they "cannot trick us any more.").
In a recent example, in October 2006, Yanza offered to give ONHAE officials "1,000 boots"
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On October 12,2006, 118 representatives from twenty-eight Huaorani and
Lower Napo Kichwa communities filed a motion to intervene in Republic of
Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp. In an April 2006 ruling, that court had
denied a motion by Ecuador and Petroecuador (collectively "Ecuador") to
dismiss a counterclaim by ChevronTexaco and Texaco Petroleum (collectively
"ChevronTexaco") which implicates the rights and claims of the Kichwa,
Huaorani, and other affected groups.96 The counterclaim asserts that the
environmental remediation claims in the Lago Agrio lawsuit are barred by
releases granted to ChevronTexaco by Ecuador pursuant to the 1995
Remediation Contract (discussed above) and a subsequent agreement, the
1998 "Final Act," which certified that Texaco Petroleum had performed its
obligations under the Remediation Contract.
Although the language in both the contract and Final Act explicitly states
that the release from liability applies to claims by the Ecuadorian State and
national oil company - and Ecuador maintains that it did not intend or agree
to extinguish any rights or claims by third parties - ChevronTexaco alleges
that Ecuador (and Petroecuador) "owned all rights to environmental
remediation or restoration" by ChevronTexaco in the concession area at the
time the agreements were signed, and "filly released those rights in exchange
for the remediation performed" under the agreement. The company further
contends that Ecuador breached those agreements by "allowing the Lago
Agrio lawsuit to proceed" without intervening to inform the court that it"owned and released all rights to environmental remediation and restoration"
by ChevronTexaco, and by refusing to indemnify the company for its costs in
that litigation. The counterclaim states that ChevronTexaco has incurred
"millions of dollars in attorneys' fees, consulting fees, and expenses.., to
date in connection with defending" the Lago Agrio lawsuit, and asks the court
to award damages and declaratory and injunctive relief.97
if they attended a public forum in Coca that was co-sponsored by Frente. The offer insulted
many Huaorani, who believed that it was a trick to try to create the appearance, at the forum,
that Frente represents the Huaorani in the Texaco case. As discussed supra, the Huaorani and
Kichwa ofMakarik Nihua organized a protest to demand to speak for themselves at the forum,
with support from ONHAE. In January 2007, an ONHAE assembly endorsed the decision by
the Huaorani in the Makarik Nihua alliance to work to defend the rights of the Huaorani People,
and ratified the Makarik Nihua Denunciation.
96. See Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, 426 F. Supp. 2d 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The
court also ruled that New York law would apply to the counterclaim. See also Republic of
Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (disposing of related
motions).
97. ChevronTexaco Answer and Counterclaim, supra note 64, I1 10, 13, 64. Specifically,
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Despite the fact that Aguinda v. Texaco, which was pending when the
release was negotiated, clearly sought both damages and equitable relief for
environmental remediation,9' ChevronTexaco now contends thatAguinda was
primarily an action for damages to individuals, unlike the Lago Agrio lawsuit
which seeks to vindicate public rights to remediation. 99 According to the
company, a statute enacted in Ecuador in 1999, the Law of Environmental
Management, first granted Ecuadorian citizens the right to sue companies like
ChevronTexaco for general environmental remediation, as distinguished from
claims based on specific injuries to individuals. Previously, the company
maintains, those claims belonged exclusively to Ecuador.' 00 If accepted by the
court, this new legal theory - first asserted by ChevronTexaco in Republic
of Ecuador in 2005 but evidently not reported in media accounts of the
dispute - would radically limit the source and scope of affected residents'
the Counterclaim seeks an injunction ordering Ecuador and Petroecuador to indemnify Texaco
Petroleum and ChevronTexaco for all fees and expenses relating to the Lago Agrio lawsuit, and
a declaration that Petroecuador is in breach of its obligation to indemnify Texaco Petroleum
under the consortium's operating agreement; that Ecuador and Petroecuador are in breach of
their obligations under the releases; and that Ecuador and Petroecuador "are obliged to intervene
in the Lago Agrio litigation and inform the Ecuadorian court that they owned and released all
rights to environmental remediation and restoration" by Texaco Petroleum in the area, and to
indemnify and hold harmless Texaco Petroleum and ChevronTexaco for all fees and expenses
relating to the Lago Agrio lawsuit, "including any final judgment that may be rendered against
ChevronTexaco in Ecuador." The Counterclaim also seeks costs of the New York action,
including attorneys' fees. Id. pt. VI. It characterizes the Lago Agrio case as a"private-attorney-general action." Id. 75.
98. Aguinda Complaint, supra note 42; Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir.
1998) (remanding Aguinda after the first dismissal); Transcript of Proceedings Before Hon. Jed
S. Rakoff, Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 94 Civ. 9266 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1999). In addition, the
Aguinda attorneys and Texaco discussed payments for environmental remediation in settlement
negotiations while that lawsuit was pending. The talks took place after the releases had been
signed, and a written settlement proposal presented by the plaintiffs' lawyers to Texaco in 2001
reportedly sought tens of mi!ions of dollars for environmental remediation, significantly more
that was requested to com, ensate plaintiffs and the class for damages. See supra note 70.
99. As observed by the Court in New York:
Absent this contention by Defendants, it would be extremely difficult for
Defendants to establish that claims nominally brought by third parties in the Lago
Agrio litigation were covered by the 1995 and 1998 agreements between Texaco
and Ecuador: it is highly unlikely that a settlement entered into while Aguinda was
pending would have neglected to mention the third-party claims being
contemporaneously made in Aguinda if it had been intended to release those
claims or to create an obligation to indemnify against them ....
Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, 376 F. Supp. 2d 334, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
100. See Law of Environmental Management, supra note 72.
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environmental rights and claims, and could bar them from pursuing many of
the claims asserted against ChevronTexaco in the Aguinda and proposed
intervener complaints.'0° It contradicts Texaco's assurances to the Aguinda
court that those plaintiffs' claims could be adequately litigated in an
Ecuadorian forum and is contested by Ecuador, which maintains that
Ecuadorian citizens possessed the right to sue oil companies for remediation
prior to the 1999 legislation.0 2
The Kichwa and Huaorani representatives sought to intervene for two
purposes. The first purpose was to protect their rights, claims, and interests,
and "vigorously dispute" ChevronTexaco's allegation that they lacked the
right to sue Texaco for remediation and restoration prior to enactment of the
1999 law, and "the corollary implication that absent the legislation, they
would have no rights or claims for remediation or restoration against
ChevronTexaco or any other oil company that damaged, destroyed, degraded,
and/or contaminated their environment and natural resources." The second
purpose of intervening was to assert claims against ChevronTexaco that are
not being litigated in New York or Lago Agrio. °3 Their proposed complaint
101. See ChevronTexaco Answer & Counterclaim, supra note 64; Declaration of C. MacNeil
Mitchell, Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, 2006 WL 3887089 (No. 04-CV-8378), at
Exhibit 5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2006); Reply Memorandum of Law of Proposed Intervening
Plaintiffs Kemperi Baihua, et. al., in Support of the Motion of Kemperi Baihua, et. al., to
Intervene as Plaintiffs Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.24, at 15-16, Republic of Ecuador v.
ChevronTexaco, No 04-CV-8378 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Reply in Support of
Intervention] (arguing that newspaper articles submitted by Ecuador to oppose intervention as
untimely "in no way suggest that this case is a dispute about whether affected third parties have
legal rights and claims to environmental remediation and restoration" but rather portray it "as
a contract dispute over the costs of environmental remediation, whether Petroecuador must
share financial responsibility for the environmental disaster caused by [Chevron]Texaco, and
whether Petroecuador must indemnify [Chevron] Texaco for costs and any possible judgment
against it that might result from the Lago Agrio litigation").
102. Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, 426 F. Supp. 2d 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
103. Memorandum of Law of Proposed Intervening Plaintiffs Kemperi Baihua, et al., in
Support of the Motion to Intervene of Kemperi Baihua, et al., to Intervene as Plaintiffs Pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P.24, at 6, Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, 2006 WL 3669156 (No. 04-
CV-8378) (Oct. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Memorandum in Support of Intervention]. The author
was co-counsel for the proposed intervening plaintiffs (with Law Offices of Robert T. Vance,
Jr.). The Kichwa proposed interveners are members of nineteen Lower Napo Kichwa
communities; they sought to intervene on behalf of their families and communities. The
Huaorani are from nine communities and sought to intervene on behalf of their families,
communities, and the Huaorani People. Id. at Exhibit A. Many of the proposed interveners and
their communities participated in the effort to sue ChevronTexaco in Tena; none were plaintiffs
in the Lago Agrio case or Aguinda.
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included common law claims for damages and equitable relief (for
remediation and restoration and for medical monitoring) and three claims
based on international law, including discrimination and other human rights
violations and, on behalf of the Huaorani People, a claim for ethnocide and
violation of the right to culture.'°4
104. Id. The complaint cites fifteen international law instruments and customary
international law, among other sources of law, in support of the causes of action. The
discrimination claim cites the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (in effect since 1965), other international human rights instruments, and
ILO Convention 169. It includes allegations related to racism against indigenous peoples in
Ecuador and accuses Texaco of discriminating against the Kichwa and Huaorani in the
following respects, among others: failing to respect their land and property rights in the same
manner that such rights were respected for others, and engaging in conduct for the purpose
and/or effect of impairing or nullifying their land and property rights; failing to indemnify them
for damages or undertake adequate reparation of damages in the manner that such rights were
respected for others; callously disregarding their rights, interests, health, environment and
welfare, and engaging in conduct that had the purpose and/or effect of impairing or nullifying
their land, environmental and human rights, cruelly disrupting their lives, cultural practices and
way of life, impairing and/or endangering their means of subsistence, food security, economy,
health and cultural survival, which resulted in a grossly disproportionate distribution ofthe costs
and benefits of development and unequal protection of the law; promoting, assisting, supporting
and profiting from ethnocidal policies and practices that had the purpose of altering and/or
exterminating their cultures and way of life, and impairing and/or nullifying their rights;
promoting, assisting, supporting, and profiting from policies and practices that had the purpose
and/or effect of impairing their exercise and enjoyment of their land, cultural, and other rights
on the basis of racist doctrines of Christian and white superiority and other ideas or theories of
the superiority of Western culture over indigenous cultures; using the tern "Auca," which is a
racist and derogatory term used to refer to the Huaorani, which means "savage" and is
considered deeply insulting by the Huaorani, in names that it gave to oil fields and infrastructure
located in lands from which the Huaorani had been displaced; failing to implement a 1982
Environmental Policy directive in the Ecuador operations in the same manner or to the same
extent that the policy (distributed by Texaco, Inc.) was implemented in operations in the United
States; undertaking "remedial activities" (pursuant to the 1995 Remediation Contract) "on the
cheap," with the purpose or effect of perpetuating an international double standard of
environmental protection, whereby certain standards and practices that were commonly used in
the United States were not applied in Ecuador, and certain standards and practices were used
in Ecuador that were not generally accepted and applied in the United States, and which resulted
in lower levels of environmental protection in Ecuador; collaborating with the Republic of
Ecuador and missionaries from the United States to cruelly displace Huaorani from large tracts
of their ancestral lands, with the purpose and effect of impairing and/or nullifying the land and
cultural rights of the Huaorani, denying them the right to enjoy, develop, and transmit their own
culture and exterminating their way of life, and promoting racist doctrines and ideas of the
superiority of Christianity and Western civilization and culture, and aiding, supporting, and
abetting those activities; and cruelly and callously facilitating the conquest and pacification of
the Huaorani Nation (by Ecuador), with the purpose and/or effect of impairing or nullifying
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In their submissions to the court, the proposed intervening plaintiffs argued
that Ecuador could not adequately protect their interests in the litigation for
three principal reasons. First, their international law claims also implicate
Ecuador and Petroecuador, so Ecuador has a conflict of interest. Second,
Ecuador's legal arguments related to whether the 1995 and 1998 agreements
extinguished or barred local residents' rights appear to center on Ecuadorian
law and do not take into account third party rights under international law, so
intervention would allow the court to have the benefit of a more fully
developed record. Third, as a practical matter, it would be a mistake to rely
on Ecuador to adequately represent the interests of the interveners because
Ecuador and Petroecuador have failed to protect or respect their rights
throughout the history of the operations and, although they agree with
Ecuador's current position that the releases do not bar their environmental
remediation claims, the government of Ecuador is "plagued by chronic
instability and endemic corruption." No elected president has completed his
term of office since 1996, new elections were scheduled for 2006, and during
the course of the Aguinda litigation, "successive governments repeatedly
changed the position of the Republic of Ecuador in submissions to the
court."' 5 In addition, the decision by Ecuador to withdraw an important
affirmative defense days before the motion to intervene was filed raised
further concerns about its willingness and capacity to adequately protect the
interests of the Kichwa and Huaorani. That defense, that the 1995 and 1998
agreements are "voidable and may be rescinded" because they were "procured
[by ChevronTexaco] through fraudulent inducement" - more specifically, by"a series of material misrepresentations or omissions [about the environmental
status of the oil fields Texaco had been operating] that [ChevronTexaco] knew
were false and misleading and would be reasonably relied on" by Ecuador and
Petroecuador106 - was dropped in order to limit the issues to be tried.
Ecuador and Petroecuador had added the additional affirmative defense by
stipulation in August 2006,'07 but then "determined that litigation regarding
their free exercise and enjoyment of their ancestral lands and their right to own, develop,
control, and use their communal lands, territories and resources, and with reckless disregard for
their health and welfare. Id. M 116-122.
105. Memorandum in Support of Intervention, supra note 103, at 10-13.
106. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Amend Their Reply to
Defendants' Counterclaims in Order to Assert One Additional Affirmative Defense, at 2, 4,
Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, No. 04-CV-8378 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2006).
107. Stipulation and Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Their Reply to
Defendants' Counterclaims in Order to Assert One Additional Affirmative Defense, Republic
of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, No. 04-CV-8378 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2006).
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the scope and cause of environmental harm in the concession area simply
required too great an expenditure of resources with too little time prior to trial
to complete," and decided to "husband their resources."' 8
ChevronTexaco and Ecuador both opposed the motion to intervene,
essentially arguing that it was untimely; that intervention would prejudice the
parties and significantly expand and delay the proceeding; that the Kichwa
and Huaorani do not have a legal interest that may be impaired in the litigation
because it is a contractual dispute, and they are strangers to the contracts and
agreements between the parties; and that any interest they may have could be
adequately protected by Ecuador.0 9 In November 2006, the court denied the
motion, ruling that there is "a strong need for the case to proceed as
expeditiously as possible."'"10 Although discovery was still underway, Judge
Leonard Sand noted that the trial date of March 1, 2007, had been set "for
some time" and the parties had "incurred considerable expense" in "reliance
on that trial date." Intervention would delay the case and "significantly alter
the nature of the proceeding," converting it into "a toxic tort case of the sort
which the Second Circuit has already opined in a related case [Aguinda] ...
108. The Republic of Ecuador's and Petroecuador's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
to Intervene, Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, at 15, No. 04-CV-8378 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
30, 2006) [hereinafter Ecuador Opposition to Intervention]; see also Reply in Support of
Intervention, supra note 101, at 18.
109. The parties also argued that the interveners should have known about their alleged
interest when ChevronTexaco filed its Answer to the Amended Complaint and Counterclaim
in January 2005. Memorandum of Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs ChevronTexaco and
Texaco Petroleum Company in Opposition to Motion of Kemperi Baihua et al. to Intervene as
Plaintiffs Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.24, Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco, No. 04-CV-8378
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ChevronTexaco Opposition to Intervention]. Ecuador
further contended that: ChevronTexaco's legal maneuvering had been widely publicized and is
known in Ecuador; substantially identical issues are being litigated in Lago Agrio; Ecuador had
lost its right to assert the now-withdrawn defense of fraud in the inducement, so the movants
should not be allowed to pursue those and similar fact-intensive issues; the movants would not
be impaired by an adverse judgment because there is no pending federal court action, and
Ecuador's courts do not apply the doctrine of stare decisis; the movants could bring another,
separate action; and Ecuador would not agree to waive sovereign immunity to any third party
claims. Ecuador Opposition to Intervention, supra note 108. ChevronTexaco further contended
that the interveners were trying to split their claims, forum shop, and circumvent prior
judgments, and that they have an action pending against ChevronTexaco in Tena; that the case
in New York would not limit or determine the scope of any further environmental remediation
but only decide who would bear the cost, if any; and that the movants share Ecuador's interest
in making ChevronTexaco pay. ChevronTexaco Opposition to Intervention, supra note 109.
110. Transcript of Proceedings Before Hon. Leonard B. Sand, Republic of Ecuador v.
ChevronTexaco, at 12, No. 04 CV 8378 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 6, 2006) (on file with author).
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is inappropriate for resolution in the United States." The court stressed that
the underlying dispute in the litigation is whether ChevronTexaco and
Ecuador's dispute can be the subject of arbitration in the United States, and
that the parties "have a great deal at stake with respect to the timing" of the
litigation - "[a]rbitration being a form of dispute resolution that people
invoke in their agreements ... [with] the expectation that it is a relatively
speedy and efficient procedure to resolve disputes.' ' .
The court's reliance on the need for a speedy resolution of the underlying
arbitration dispute is ironic in view of the fact that ChevronTexaco did not
initiate arbitration proceedings until more than ten years after it was first sued
by the Aguinda plaintiffs, and its representations to the Aguinda court that it
would implead Petroecuador in lawsuits by those plaintiffs in Ecuador. In
addition, although Judge Sand noted that "it is distressing to read [in the
submissions] the belief I'm sure is held that the would-be interveners are
being deprived of a fair and effective judicial system in their home
country," 1 2 he did not address their argument that any prejudice caused to
111. Id. at 11-12. The court also noted that the parties "have agreed to forego certain
positions which would have precluded the trial from going forward effectively" on the
scheduled date. Id. at 12.
112. Id. at 1t; see Memorandum in Support of Intervention, supra note 103, at 14-15; Reply
in Support of Intervention, supra note 101, at 3-13 (discussing the Lago Agrio and Tena
litigation). Interestingly, ChevronTexaco did not dispute the Proposed Interveners' assertion
that the refusal by the Tena court to open their case was "an act of corruption." The company
incorrectly implied, however, that the Proposed Interveners were being duplicitous by allegedly
attempting to pursue two actions at the same time. In a disquieting disclosure, ChevronTexaco
stated that its counsel had been "advised informally that service of process is imminent" in the
Tena case. ChevronTexaco Opposition to Intervention, supra note 109, at 1; see also Reply in
Support of Intervention, supra note 101, at 9-13. As discussed supra, service of process is an
action that Ecuadorian legal procedures place in the hands of the judge who will decide a
lawsuit (in the first instance), rather than the plaintiffs. ChevronTexaco did not explain how it
was "advised informally" about an action that would be undertaken by the Tena court before it
had occurred, or disclose its source; the Tena plaintiffs and their counsel had no such
knowledge. The suggestion that the case could somehow proceed without the plaintiffs'
knowledge or participation is troubling. In addition, the timing of the "informal" disclosure
suggested foul play and corroborated the Proposed Interveners' misgivings about Ecuador's
judicial system: after more than three years of delay caused by the Tena court's unlawful refusal
to open their case, and nine months after the complaint had been returned by the Supreme Court
to the Tena court, ChevronTexaco asserted that the case would be revived and opened. That
revelation was made just as some of the Tena plaintiffs were seeking to intervene in the
litigation in New York (where courts do not permit "informal" exparte communications) and
despite the fact that the Tena plaintiffs had not taken any action to attempt to reinitiate that case.
Id.
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ChevronTexaco by allowing intervention would be "a self-inflicted wound"
caused by the company's injection of the Huaorani and Kichwa communities'
legal interests into the case. By seeking a judicial determination that Ecuador
and Petroecuador owned and released all rights to environmental remediation
and restoration by the company, and that the proposed interveners and their
communities have no such rights or claims, ChevronTexaco had itself
transformed the case from a simple breach of contract dispute - about
whether arbitration is appropriate and about how to allocate the costs of the
liabilities of Texaco's operations - into a case that could have far-reaching
implications for all of the inhabitants of the affected region. Had the company
limited the issues in the litigation to purely contractual ones, the proposed
interveners argued, and not sought a ruling that would severely limit the scope
and sources of their rights and claims, they would not have been compelled to
seek intervention to protect and vindicate their rights." 3
In June 2007, as this article was going to print, Judge Sand ruled that
Ecuador and Petroecuador had not agreed to arbitrate disputes with Texaco,
and granted their request (in a motion for summary judgment) for a permanent
injunction staying Chevron from continuing the arbitration in New York. The
portion of the summary judgment determination relating to claims based on
the 1995 Remediation Contract was set aside for the parties to reevaluate their
posture; Judge Sand noted that the plaintiffs had stated that they would
withdraw their claims if they were victorious on the arbitrability issue, and
granted the parties sixty days to confer and advise the court "what further
proceedings, if any, they intend to pursue before this Court."'" 4
Outside court, in another recent development, the Kichwa and Huaorani
alliance resolved to also become more proactive, by beginning to develop and
implement remedial projects themselves, rather than simply denouncing,
exhorting, petitioning - and waiting for others to act. The Kichwa want to
begin an environmental remediation by cleaning up an abandoned waste pit
and reclaiming the site for sustainable community development; a longer term
goal is to provide every family in the community with access to safe drinking
water.
The Huaorani decided to prioritize cultural damages, and to begin by
supporting a grassroots initiative to protect a 758,051 -hectare" 5 area of
113. Reply in Support of Intervention, supra note 101, at 17-20.
114. Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 04 Civ. 8378, slip op. at 27-28
(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2007).
115. One hectare is 100 meters x 100 meters; 758,051 hectares is 7, 581 square kilometers,
or 2,927 square miles, roughly the size of Delaware and Rhode Island combined.
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rainforest known as the "Intangible Zone." The Intangible Zone was
designated as a conservation area - off-limits to oil development, mining,
and logging - in 1999, and includes the territory of the last (known) group
of uncontacted Huaorani, the Taromenane-Tagaeri, as well as lands that are
used and occupied by three communities of contacted Huaorani. 6  The
116. Constitutional President ofthe Republic, Decreto EjecutivoNo. 552 [Executive Decree
No. 552], R.O. No. 121 (Feb. 2, 1999) (Ecuador) (declaring an "intangible zone" of
approximately 700,000 hectares in Huaorani titled lands and Yasuni National Park, to be
delimited within 120 days); Constitutional President of the Republic, Decreto Ejecutivo No.
2187 [Executive Decree No. 2187] (Jan. 3, 2007) (Ecuador) (defining boundaries, spanning
758,051 hectares, of the intangible zone decreed in 1999 to protect the rights of the Tagaeri,
Taromenane, and other uncontacted groups of Huaorani). The 2007 decree also designates a
buffer zone, which includes lands that are used and occupied by a fourth community of
contacted Huaorani. Reportedly, a commitment by the European Community to provide
economic aid for conservation was an important factor in the initial decision (by then-President
Mahuad) to protect the Intangible Zone from oil development and other extractive industries.
In addition, a history of violent encounters with the Tagaeri (which continued even after they
were driven from their homelands by Texaco's operations), lobbying by the Catholic Church
in Ecuador, and growing international pressure to respect the right of the Tagaeri to resist
contact with "Western" society and to protect them from extinction by protecting the lands they
inhabit, likely played a role.
The decrees are significant because Ecuador permits oil development in other protected
areas, including national parks, and in lands that are titled to the Huaorani (and other indigenous
groups) without obtaining their consent. According to ONHAE, 80% ofHuaorani Territory has
been included in areas licensed to oil companies by the state. In a message to "the peoples who
live where the oil companies come from," Kemperi Baihua, a Huaorani shaman and leader who
lives in the Intangible Zone, explained why his community, Bameno, opposes further expansion
of the oil frontier:
My message is that we are living here. We are living bien (in a good way). No
more [oil] companies should come, because already there are enough. They need
to know that we have problems; I want them to comprehend what we are living.
Many companies want to enter, everywhere. But they do not help; they have come
to damage the forest. Instead of going hunting, they cut down trees to make paths.
Instead of caring for [the forest], they destroy. Where the company lives, it smells
nasty; the animals hide; and when the river rises the manioc and plantain in the
low areas have problems. We respect the environment where we live. We like the
tourists because they come, and go away. When the company comes, it does not
want to leave. Now [the company] is in the habit of offering many things; it says
that it comes to do business, but then it makes itself into the owner. Where the
company has left its environment, we cannot return. It stays bad. Something must
remain for us. Without territory, we cannot live. If they destroy everything, where
will we live? We do not want more companies to enter, or more roads. We want
to live like Huaorani, we want others to respect our culture.
Message from Kemperi Baihua, Huaorani Community of Bameno, Cononaco River (2005)
(translated from Huaorani to Spanish by Penti Baihua) (related to the author on August 8, 2005
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Taromenane-Tagaeri are the only known group of people still living in
voluntary isolation in the Amazon Rainforest in Ecuador, but are threatened
with extinction by encroaching oil development and violent encounters with
illegal loggers." 7 The remedial project is led by contacted Huaorani in the
area who are working to defend their culture and rainforest environment
(which go hand-in-hand) by organizing to stop logging in the Intangible Zone
and to support community-based alternatives to logging and oil extraction that
"do not damage the environment or bother the Taromenane, Tagaeri, or other
Huaorani who want to live in isolation in the forest.""' 8 These remedial
initiatives represent small steps forward in what is expected to be a long and
challenging process, and they will require considerable external support to
succeed. However, they also represent a major new approach to the need to
remedy problems that began with Texaco's arrival, and continue to this day.
VII. Conclusion and Recommendations
ChevronTexaco's discovery of commercially valuable oil in the Amazon
Rainforest in Ecuador was heralded as the salvation of Ecuador's economy,
the product that would pull the nation out of poverty and "underdevelopment"
at last. The discovery ignited an oil rush that made the conquest of Amazonia
a national imperative, and petroleum quickly came to dominate Ecuador's
economy and quest for progress.
But the reality of oil exploration and production turned out to be far more
complex that its triumphalist launch. For indigenous Amazonian peoples,
including the Huaorani and Lower Napo Kichwa, the arrival of
ChevronTexaco meant destruction rather than development. Their homelands
were invaded and degraded by outsiders who, over time, dramatically
transformed natural and social environments. Their worlds changed forever,
in Bameno and first published in KIMERLING, MODEL OR MYTH?, supra note 30, at 7-8).
117. Logging is a growing problem in Huaorani Territory and Yasuni National Park. It
began in the vicinity of the road that Texaco built into traditional Huaorani territory but has
steadily expanded deeper into the forest. Until recently, it was limited to one type of tree, cedro.
The wood trade is reportedly controlled by Colombians based in Francisco de Orellana (Coca),
who hire Afro-Ecuadorians and Kichwa from other areas to go into the forest to extract wood.
It is transported by canoe to the Texaco road; from there it travels by truck to Coca, and then
reportedly to Colombia. Before reaching Coca, the Texaco road passes by a military base,
located across the Napo River from Coca; however, the control at the entrance to the bridge that
crosses the river is no longer manned. Many people privately attribute the failure of Ecuadorian
authorities to control the wood trade at that location to a lack of political will and corruption.
118. The alternatives include locally-controlled tourism and sales of sustainable products.
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Amazonian peoples have borne the costs of oil development without sharing
in its benefits and without participating in decisionmaking that affects them.
The Aguinda v. Texaco lawsuit created an unprecedented opportunity for
corporate accountability and environmental justice. The allegations in the
complaint echoed longstanding grievances in the oil patch. The idea of
equality before the law and the international spotlight held by the litigation
emboldened affected populations and catalyzed many people to action.
However, many factors have made it difficult for local communities to
participate in the litigation or have a voice in its conduct.
Class action lawsuits can be a powerful vehicle to influence corporate
behavior and obtain remedies for large numbers of people, but in cases like
Aguinda, it can be difficult to identify an appropriate class and provide class
members with meaningful information and input into the conduct of the case.
The failure of the Aguinda plaintiffs' lawyers and their NGO supporters to
foster transparent, participatory, and accountable processes for decision-
making by the claimants - and their apparent determination to, in the words
of local critics, "speak for all but work only with a few" - has threatened the
case's potential to sow the seeds of a veritable environmental justice and
human rights legacy in Ecuador's oil frontier." 9
For lawyers, activists, academics, and oil companies, legal precedents that
penalize multinational corporations and build instruments for international
environmental accountability under the current free trade regime are clearly
significant. Yet to the Aguinda plaintiffs and class, that is an abstract concept;
they have concrete needs. When it comes to remedies, cases like Aguinda
pose special, but not necessarily insurmountable, challenges. It remains to be
seen whether a victory in court, or a settlement through plaintiffs' counsel,
will obtain meaningful remedies for affected populations and the environment,
or simply empower and enrich a new layer of elites, and set back grassroots
struggles for corporate accountability and environmental justice by promoting
conflict, corruption, and cynicism. Those who have suffered most from
ChevronTexaco's operations risk becoming symbols ofj ustice without getting
justice or adequate remedies.
The emergence of an unprecedented community-based alliance (Makarik
Nihua) among Huaorani and Napo Kichwa members of the class, in the wake
of Aguinda, to work together to protect and vindicate their rights, has
119. At the same time, the need by the plaintiffs' lawyers and NGOs to legitimize their
activities and develop mechanisms to deal, in their way, with a large and diverse group of
claimants, has led them to try to impose (and/or support) a spurious political process, the
"Assembly of Delegates of the People Affected by Texaco's Operations."
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revitalized local struggles for environmental protection and respect for the
rights of indigenous peoples. However, the response of external legal and
political institutions and actors, including private NGOs that claim to support
the affected communities, has been disappointing, and it remains to be seen
whether the Huaorani and Kichwa - and Aguinda plaintiffs and other
members of the putative class - will get an impartial adjudication of their
claims.
The decision to dismiss Aguinda v. Texaco was colored by a series of
detailed but questionable factual assumptions, including erroneous and
unsupported findings about the litigation record in Ecuador's courts, and
rulings on disputed material facts related to decision-making and control of
the operations that gave rise to the plaintiffs' claims. The portrait of Texaco's
role in the operations in the decision to dismiss is incongruous with the reality
of oil development in Ecuador, including the environmental law vacuum and
culture of impunity in the oil frontier, the experience of Amazonian peoples
and other Ecuadorians with the company, and the image cultivated by Texaco
before it was sued. The application of theforum non conveniens doctrine to
dismiss the case represents an abdication of responsibility by the federal
judiciary and sends a troubling message: that U.S. laws and institutions create
and protect multinational corporations, but generally do not regulate their
operations and decline to act when they harm people and the environment
abroad.
Although the decision by the Northern District of California to allow Doe
v. Texaco to go to trial suggests that some judges are open to claims by
discrete and clearly defined groups of foreign plaintiffs who have real
grievances against U.S. corporations, the refusal by Judge Sand to allow the
Huaorani and Kichwa representatives to intervene in Republic of Ecuador v.
ChevronTexaco indicates that access to the administration of justice in U.S.
courts, and protection under the law, is unequal. At the same time, the effort
by both Ecuador and ChevronTexaco, in response to the motion to intervene,
to limit the issues and law in that dispute to contractual intent (based on secret
negotiations, without participation by affected groups or other democratic
safeguards) and treat the Kichwa and Huaorani who are injured by their
agreements as "strangers" to those accords, with no legally cognizable
interests, continues the historic trend of excluding indigenous Amazonian
peoples from decision-making processes, and disregarding their rights. That
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dynamic persists to this day 2 ° and is reflected and reinforced by Judge Sand's
decision to deny the motion to intervene.
In reflecting on the role of international law, there are many international
norms that support the claims of the Huaorani and Kichwa, and other affected
groups. However, those norms primarily, but not exclusively, oblige state
actors. Most importantly, they rely on those same state actors to apply and
enforce them. In this case, the harmful operations were transnational in
nature, and two national legal systems have had jurisdiction over myriad
claims. One state, Ecuador, embraces the discourse of international law and
has even written much of it into the highest law of the land, the constitution,
but its political institutions, including the courts, are so notoriously corrupt
and dysfunctional that there is a staggering gap between those legal ideals and
social and political realities. The other state, the United States, has a rich but
uneven judicial history of applying international law and adjudicating
international disputes, and appears to be more open to adjudicating
commercial litigation and to protecting the legal rights and interests of U.S.
corporations than to hearing tort litigation by foreign residents who need
remedies for injuries that those companies cause.2
Although litigation by foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts based on
development activities that are carried out in a foreign country, in partnership
with the government of that county, raises difficult legal, political, and
practical issues, there is a significant public interest and moral obligation in
the United States to remedy injuries in other countries that result from the
activities of U.S. corporations. U.S. courts have experience with complex
civil litigation and remedies and are held in high regard by many people. In
the oil fields of Amazonia and many other locations, the lack of meaningful
environmental regulation and impartial fora to administer justice are serious
problems. The Aguinda case and its progeny show that even with sixteen
years in the spotlight and considerable legal and political activity, people's
rights are still being violated and no one is accepting responsibility. Until
governments develop effective regulation of transnational corporations and
credible, effective fora to adjudicate grievances and remedy the injuries they
120. For a study of more recent developments in environmental law and efforts to limit
environmental standards to norms in negotiated agreements that exclude indigenous peoples and
disregard their rights, see Kimerling, Rio + 10, supra note 12.
121. For a fuller discussion of transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts and the rich
judicial history of applying international law, see Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public
Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991). Koh challenges the "recent status quo" ofjudicial
restraint in applying international law in noncommercial (tort) litigation.
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cause, U.S. courts should not use theforum non conveniens doctrine to deny
foreign plaintiffs who have real grievances against U.S.-based corporations a
day in court. Similarly, U.S. courts should not shy away from applying
international law, and corporations should not be allowed to use arbitration
agreements to bypass the courts and shut out plaintiffs who need to be heard.
Finally, indigenous peoples are not strangers, without interests, to
operations - and consequences - of U.S.-based corporations in their
territories, and should not be treated as such by U.S. courts or the law.
For both indigenous peoples and campesinos in the Amazon who have been
injured by ChevronTexaco and Petroecuador, environmental and social
remedies are urgently needed. The Ecuadorian government should establish
a blue ribbon commission to assess current environmental and public health
conditions in the affected areas, and develop and oversee the implementation
of a comprehensive remediation plan. The commission should include
independent experts with experience in environmental remediation and health
care, as well as representatives of affected indigenous peoples, colonists,
Petroecuador, and Chevron. The selection of commissioners to represent the
affected people(s) should be made by the affected communities, and the
number of representatives should be sufficient so that diverse groups who seek
to participate in the process can feel truly represented. The work by the
commission should be clear and transparent, and include mechanisms to
inform, consult, and gain the confidence and approval of affected
communities. The commission should also develop and monitor the
implementation of a credible mechanism to indemnify affected residents and
support community-centered sustainable development initiatives. Chevron
should assume primary responsibility for the costs of those activities, but
Ecuador, Petroecuador, and the United States government should also accept
responsibility for their complicity in the tragedy and contribute. In addition,
Petroecuador and Ecuador need to get serious about environmental protection
in the oil patch - and respect for the rights of local populations - to prevent
the re-contamination of areas that are remedied.
To prevent further injuries to Amazonian indigenous peoples and protect
their rights in the development process, the principle of free, prior, and
informed consent needs to be applied in the oil fields. As a general matter, the
imposition of alien models of development on indigenous peoples against their
wishes is unconscionable. In Ecuador, the experience of indigenous peoples
with Texaco, Petroecuador, and Aguinda v. Texaco and its progeny clearly
shows that national and international political and legal systems cannot, or
will not, prevent and remedy violations of the rights of indigenous peoples.
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For the rule of law to serve as an instrument of justice, the rules must be
fair. When rules are inequitable, the rule of law can be an instrument of
aggression and destruction, rather than democracy and development. The use
of the rule of law to promote and impose oil development but not to control
or remedy the injuries it causes is fundamentally unfair and reflects and
reinforces gross inequities in law and governance. To continue to ensnare
indigenous peoples in economic globalization and subject them to the reach
and logic of global markets without equal rights and protection of the law is
unjust. In effect, corporations and governments already exercise the right of
free, prior, and informed consent when they negotiate contracts for
development. Until indigenous peoples also exercise that right - without
coercion, manipulation, or the threat of losing their lands if they say "no" to
development projects - the kinds of abuses that began with ChevronTexaco,
and are still going on today, can be expected to continue. Similarly, until
indigenous peoples enjoy equal access to the administration of justice, their
rights will continue to be violated by state parties and corporations with
impunity.
Throughout Amazonia, the environmental, social, and cultural costs of the
continued expansion of the oil frontier are still high. At best, the jury is still
out on whether companies can extract oil and gas from a rainforest
environment without serious injury. The track record of the industry to date
strongly suggests that they cannot. Moreover, the cumulative impact of
expanding oil, gas, and international pipeline projects has not been adequately
assessed. No new hydrocarbon activity should go forward in Amazonia until
major problems that already exist have been corrected, and governments and
industry have demonstrated - by action at existing facilities rather than plans
for future ones - that they can honor promises to protect the environment and
respect the rights of local populations. At least some areas should be
off-limits to oil and other industrial development, including the territory of the
Taromenane-Tagaeri band of Huaorani and other voluntarily isolated
indigenous peoples, and contacted communities who want a different model
of development should have the right to make that choice. Modem oil and gas
development that is compatible with sustainable development and the
well-being of Amazonian peoples, if it is attainable, must be based on free,
prior, and informed consent; comprehensive environmental planning that fully
considers the cumulative impact of incremental hydrocarbon and
infrastructure development throughout the region; strict controls; equal access
to redress and remedies; and careful long-term monitoring, anchored in the
rule of law and broad public participation, in the light of the day.
[Vol. 31
